United Nations S/2011/690

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 November 2011

Original: English

Identical letters dated 4 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you concerning a recent development whereby apparently two boats are trying to reach Gaza.

The boats have no connection with Turkey. None of them are under Turkish flag nor are there any Turkish subjects on board, including the captains.

The boats left Turkey on 3 November as they were fully seaworthy and declared their destination at Rhodes.

Such attempts to reach Gaza are just symptoms. The root cause is the inhuman and illegal siege of Gaza. As long as the root cause is not eliminated, the symptoms will inevitably continue to appear.

The illegality of the blockade imposed on Gaza by Israel is unquestionable. Although there is no room for question on the matter of illegality, we observe that Israel tries to base its arguments on the Palmer Report, to which it is not even signed up.

The resolutions of the Human Rights Council on the situation in Gaza, including resolution 14/1 of 2 June 2010, and document A/HRC/15/21 of 27 September 2010, concluded that Israel's land and naval blockade of Gaza is unlawful under international law, and that Israel's interdiction of the *Mavi Marmara* on the high seas was unlawful and cannot be justified under Article 51 of the Charter. These resolutions were also accepted by the United Nations General Assembly.

Also, several United Nations General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 64/10 of 5 November 2009, endorsed the report of the United Nations fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict, which concluded that the land and naval blockade implemented by Israel are unlawful.

The United Nations Security Council, too, condemned, through its presidential statement S/PRST/2010/9 of 1 June 2010, referring to resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009, Israel's use of force against the *Mavi Marmara* and other vessels of the convoy on the high seas, and reiterated the Council's grave concern at the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

The loss of life and injuries resulting from the use of force by Israeli forces during the take-over of the *Mavi Marmara* were unacceptable. Nine passengers were

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killed and many others seriously wounded by Israeli forces. No satisfactory explanation has been provided to the Panel of Inquiry by Israel for any of the nine deaths.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ertuğrul **Apakan**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2011/691

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 November 2011

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Letter dated 4 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to my letter dated 29 August 2011 (S/2011/551) and its annex, the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Ahmed Karti, regarding the ongoing violations of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and its flagrant involvement in harbouring, backing and supporting the insurgency in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States, I have the honour to convey to you once again, and through you to the esteemed members of the Security Council, the following:

1. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan continues its support to the insurgency in Blue Nile State, including with soldiers, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank artillery, tanks, ammunition, mines and grenade launchers. In addition to that the so-called Military Coordination Committee of the Sudan Liberation Army-Southern Sudan, the rebels from Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States, has transported and facilitated the movement of field commanders from SPLA and Darfur rebel movements to Blue Nile State in order to strengthen the capacities of the rebels' operations in Blue Nile State.

2. A military aircraft of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan transferred artillery crews from the Yafta area, in the Republic of South Sudan, and deployed them in the Wadaka area, in Blue Nile State. Furthermore the Government of South Sudan deployed an infantry battalion in the Kurmuk and Sali areas, in Blue Nile State, to back up the rebels there.

3. Large numbers of the rebels who fled south from the Sali area in Blue Nile State have been received and hosted in Alrank town in the Republic of South Sudan.

4. Four infantry battalions from SPLA accompanied by tanks, vehicles and military equipment have been deployed from Upper Nile State in the Republic of South Sudan to the Olu area in southern Blue Nile State in order to occupy strategic locations there.

Having brought these serious developments to your kind attention, I would be grateful if the present letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative

11-58303 (E) 081111

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United Nations S/2011/692

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 November 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 6 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 5 November 2011 from H.E. Walid Al-Moualem, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of the Syrian Arab Republic, addressed to the President of the Security Council (see annex).

I would appreciate if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

11-58466 (E) 081111 081111

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Annex to the letter dated 6 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

The Syrian Arab Republic has agreed with the ministerial committee of the League of Arab States a plan of action to bring an end to the crisis in Syria. The Syrian Arab Republic has taken a highly significant step to end the violence by calling on those bearing arms to surrender their weapons and guaranteeing their immediate release. The Syrian Arab Republic was therefore surprised that on 4 November 2011, the spokesperson for the State Department of the United States of America called on the armed individuals not to surrender their weapons to the Syrian authorities. The Government's invitation is addressed to anyone bearing, selling, distributing, transporting, purchasing or funding the purchase of weapons. It provides for their immediate release, a step amounts to a general amnesty.

The Syrian Arab Republic considers that through the State Department's statement, the United States of America has directly involved itself in the violent unrest in Syria, whose numerous innocent victims among the Syrian people include army and police personnel and civilians. The statement encourages armed groups to continue their criminal activities against the people and State. It clearly belies the peaceful nature of the movements in Syria. It reflects an intention, indeed an active attempt, to thwart the League of Arab States in its endeavour to bring an end to the crisis in Syria and restore peace and stability to the population.

Having responded positively to the initiative of the League of Arab States, and having made every effort to implement it, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic calls on the President of the Security Council to take note of and condemn the effective involvement of the United States of America in the bloodshed in Syria, to take the necessary action to put an end to it, and to assist the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in creating an environment conducive to implementing the agreement.

(*Signed*) Walid **Al-Moualem**
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants

United Nations S/2011/693

Security Council

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4 November 2011

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Report of the Secretary-General on the Lord's Resistance Army-affected areas pursuant to Security Council press statement

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Security Council press statement of 21 July 2011 (SC/10335/AFR/2215), in which the Council requested me to keep it informed on developments in relation to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), including through a report assessing the threat posed by LRA, regional efforts to address that threat and its impact, and United Nations efforts in that context.

2. The report provides an update on major developments in relation to LRA since the issuance of the previous report on the issue, dated 29 June 2006 (S/2006/478), with a particular focus on the past two years. It provides information on national, regional and international efforts, especially United Nations initiatives, aimed at tackling the challenge posed by LRA, and recommends steps the United Nations could take to further strengthen its support to the national and regional efforts to protect civilians and bring an end to the LRA menace. The report supplements LRA-related information contained in my regular reports on the United Nations peace operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU).

II. Background

3. Since it began operating in the 1980s in northern Uganda, LRA has inflicted enormous suffering on millions of civilians in several countries of the Great Lakes and Central African regions. In the 1990s and early 2000s, successive Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) operations in northern Uganda largely drove LRA into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, and, after 2008, into the Central African Republic. Several initiatives were undertaken to peacefully resolve the conflict, including efforts to facilitate a negotiated settlement between 2006 and 2008.

4. On 8 July 2005, the International Criminal Court Pre-Trial Chamber II issued, under seal, five warrants of arrest for five senior leaders of LRA, namely, Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen and Raska Lukwiya, for

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crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Uganda from 2002 to 2005. The arrest warrants were unsealed on 13 October 2005. Proceedings against Raska Lukwiya were terminated on 11 July 2007, upon confirmation of his death. Vincent Otti is presumed deceased, although the exact circumstances of his death remain contentious and the International Criminal Court is yet to terminate proceedings against him. The remaining three fugitives are still actively involved in the atrocities committed by LRA in the subregion.

5. On 1 December 2006, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, as the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the LRA-affected Areas, with a broad mandate to address the implications of the activities of LRA in the region, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, southern Sudan and northern Uganda. I renewed that mandate in 2007 and established a small political office in Kampala to facilitate the efforts of my Special Envoy.

6. In March 2008, after months of intensive efforts by regional and international stakeholders to bring the conflict to an end, representatives of the Government of Uganda and LRA finalized the final peace agreement. However, LRA leader Joseph Kony refused to sign the agreement, and in December 2008, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo launched joint military operations (Operation Lightning Thunder) against the armed group. My Special Envoy's facilitation role was consequently suspended, in the light of the lack of space for further political engagement. While those operations dislodged LRA from several parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, they also had severe humanitarian consequences and many of the civilians affected remain displaced.

7. Following the military operations, which officially ended in March 2009, LRA is believed to have fragmented into several highly mobile groups operating across a wide area, from Aba in Haut Uélé district across to Ango in Bas Uélé district in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; from Birao in Vakaga prefecture to Obo in Haut Mbomou prefecture in the Central African Republic; and into Western Equatoria State and occasionally Western Bahr el-Ghazal State in South Sudan.

8. Currently, it is estimated that LRA comprises less than 500 combatants operating under the command of Joseph Kony. It should be noted, however, that there is a wide range of opinion about how many LRA fighters remain, and these figures are estimates. In September, there were unconfirmed reports that following orders by Joseph Kony, groups of LRA combatants moved from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into eastern Central African Republic and Western Bahr el-Ghazal State in South Sudan. While Joseph Kony and Okot Odhiambo have reportedly remained in the Central African Republic, other LRA senior commanders remain highly mobile.

9. Following Operation Lightning Thunder, the national security forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan have continued to conduct military operations against LRA in the affected areas of their respective countries. In particular, UPDF, with the agreement of the relevant Governments and with logistical support from the United States of America, conducted joint military operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. These operations significantly reduced the strength and the operational capacity of LRA over the past three years. Despite the relative success of the military operations, the group continues to pose a serious

security threat to civilians, as the capacity of the national security forces in the affected countries is limited.

10. Indeed, national security forces in these countries face enormous tactical, logistical and intelligence-gathering constraints in operating against small bands of LRA combatants, which carry out hit-and-run attacks against isolated communities in areas where security, State presence, accessibility and communications are very limited.

III. Impact and threat of the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army

11. The indiscriminate attacks by LRA on civilians constitute serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, which have caused a serious humanitarian crisis in the affected countries. Between January and August 2011, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs received reports of 254 attacks by LRA on civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, resulting in 126 deaths and 368 persons abducted. An estimated 440,000 persons are currently internally displaced or living as refugees owing to LRA attacks; 335,000 are displaced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone.

12. LRA attacks, committed with impunity, have typically included killings, abductions (especially of children and women), the recruitment of and use of boys and girls as combatants and in other roles, serious sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery, forced marriage, mutilations, looting and the destruction of property. Many women who were abducted and used as sex slaves face stigmatization and great difficulties in reintegrating into their communities of origin.

13. Recent attacks appear to be aimed at ensuring the group's survival through the pillaging of food, medicine and arms and the abduction of children. "Copycat" opportunistic attacks by other armed elements in LRA-affected areas are a cause for concern and have also made it difficult to determine responsibility for specific incidents.

14. LRA attacks have also had an adverse effect on humanitarian activities. There is very limited movement of commercial goods in LRA-affected regions, especially in the Central African Republic, where goods and humanitarian convoys must be protected by the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA), and humanitarian personnel and light goods have to be largely transported by air.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

15. The majority of reported LRA attacks have taken place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, mainly in Haut Uélé district but also in Bas Uélé district, particularly north of Ango, in Orientale Province. These have included large-scale massacres, such as in December 2008, when reports indicated that over 700 people were killed in Faradje, Duru and Doruma, and in December 2009, when more than 300 persons were reportedly killed in Makombo and 206 abducted, including at least 80 children.

16. LRA remains the primary cause of displacement for over 335,000 persons in Haut Uélé and Bas Uélé. During the first half of 2011, some 49,000 people were newly displaced in Orientale Province. Most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) have settled in small towns, placing an additional burden on the limited local infrastructure such as schools, medical services and water facilities. About 85 per cent of IDPs stay with host families that are already extremely poor, and the remainder live in spontaneous IDP settlements in Dungu and Irumu territories.

17. The LRA threat has also caused some 20,000 Congolese to flee from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to South Sudan, where 15,000 have refugee status. A further 4,800 Congolese have fled to the Central African Republic, while some 1,300 Central African Republic nationals have found refuge in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after LRA attacks in their country. Between January 2010 and July 2011, some 143,000 displaced Congolese in LRA-affected areas have returned home. A further 5,000 Congolese refugees have returned from South Sudan, while 800 have returned from the Central African Republic since February. The rate of returnees dropped in 2011, with many people scared to return to their places of origin out of fear of further LRA attacks.

18. Key challenges for displaced communities in LRA-affected areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are the lack of access to farm fields owing to insecurity and the few alternative livelihood opportunities apart from agriculture. This has deepened the population's vulnerability and increased dependency on humanitarian aid. The civilian population's vulnerability is further exacerbated by the limited availability of basic social services and infrastructure, including roads, schools and health centres.

Central African Republic

19. Despite a reduction in the number of attacks, small groups of 5 to 10 LRA elements continue to perpetrate serious violence against civilians in the Central African Republic, including killings, looting and abductions. Between January and September 2011, 26 attacks were recorded by humanitarian partners in the Central African Republic, resulting in 14 deaths, 7 wounded and 122 abducted. Between 19 September and 1 October 2011, assailants attacked three villages in the Mbomou, Haut Mbomou (near Obo) and Haute Kotto prefectures, resulting in two deaths, one abduction and the displacement of hundreds. The perpetrators of these attacks remain unknown. In 2010, some 83 people were killed and 13 injured as a result of LRA attacks, with a further 324 abducted, of whom only 121 were released or escaped.

20. As at 10 August 2011, there were 19,152 IDPs in Mbomou and Haut Mbomou as a result of LRA activities, and some 4,800 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo also remained in the country. Self-defence groups have reportedly been formed in LRA-affected areas in Haut Mbomou.

South Sudan

21. In South Sudan, LRA is mostly active in the States of Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal, where three incidents have been reported since July 2011. With the overall improvement in the security situation, some IDPs have returned home to

resume agricultural activities, although others still rely on food assistance. The "Arrow Boys" or "Home Guards", a self-defence group established in 2010, and UPDF, with support from the Sudan People's Liberation Army, are helping protect communities against LRA in Western Equatoria. However, the long-term consequences and impact of having such armed civilian groups operating outside of Government command and control is a matter of concern.

Uganda

22. Most of the 1.8 million people formerly displaced as a result of LRA activities in northern Uganda have returned to their villages of origin or integrated locally elsewhere. Some 80,000 IDPs remain in six camps in northern Uganda, unable to return home owing to the presence of landmines and land disputes, among other obstacles. Steps are being taken to find durable solutions for the former IDPs, including through improving basic social services and restoring northern Uganda's agricultural productive capacity. In this regard, in June 2011, the Government of Uganda announced an additional five-year extension of the peace, recovery and development plan for northern Uganda beyond its anticipated completion in mid-2012. The second phase of the plan is being prepared with input from key stakeholders.

IV. National, regional and international efforts

23. During the past two years, the Governments of the four LRA-affected countries and regional and international partners have undertaken a range of measures to address the issue of LRA and the impact of its activities.

24. The Chiefs of Defence Staff of the four affected countries met in Kinshasa on 29 and 30 September, with the participation of representatives of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), to review operations against LRA. It was recommended, inter alia, that there should be close cooperation and coordination among the national security forces within a regional framework and that the African Union should expedite the implementation of its regional coordinated strategy on LRA. In this regard, the Joint Information Operations Centre, based in Dungu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, comprised of personnel from Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), UPDF and MONUSCO, is operational. Its objective is to coordinate FARDC and UPDF military operations against LRA, and gather and analyse information about the group's activities. Furthermore, MONUSCO, the Joint Information Operations Centre, and FARDC and UPDF field commanders coordinate activities relating to abductees released from LRA.

25. In recent months, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops deployed to fight LRA, except for those involved in information gathering that could be co-located with FARDC. The Government has indicated that only a small number of LRA elements remain in the country and that they should be dealt with as a public order issue.

26. On 11 July 2011, the High Court of Uganda, International Crimes Division, commenced the trial of former LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo for war crimes, allegedly committed in northern Uganda, under the 1964 Geneva Conventions Act and other charges under the Penal Code Act. On 12 January 2010, Mr. Kwoyelo applied for amnesty under the Uganda Amnesty Act, and on 22 September, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Mr. Kwoyelo on the basis that the State, in refusing to facilitate the granting of amnesty to Mr. Kwoyelo, treated him unfairly and violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the law. The State has filed an appeal to the Supreme Court and the trial has been put on hold.

27. As at September 2011, 26,130 suspected LRA and other armed group combatants had been granted amnesty under the Uganda Amnesty Act, including former senior LRA commanders such as Kenneth Banya, Sam Kolo and Charles Arop. In some instances, these former LRA elements have joined UPDF to track LRA and have been deployed to areas where they had previously committed atrocities against the civilian population while with LRA.

28. At the regional level, the African Union has assumed a leadership role in coordinating efforts against LRA since the African Union summit held in Kampala in July 2010. During the summit, it was decided that the African Union would organize without delay action-oriented consultations between countries affected by LRA activities and other interested parties, with a view to facilitating a coordinated regional action against the threat posed by LRA.

29. Subsequently, a regional ministerial meeting focusing on tackling the LRA issue was held under the auspices of the African Union Commission, on 13 and 14 October 2010 in Bangui. The meeting was attended by senior Government officials from the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda and representatives of France, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations. Several proposals were made to address the problems caused by LRA, including the appointment of a Special Envoy on LRA; the establishment of a joint coordination mechanism in Bangui chaired by the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security; and the establishment of a joint brigade or regional intervention force. The regional intervention force would comprise contingents from the national armies of the four LRA-affected countries to conduct military operations, as well as a joint operations centre in Yambio, South Sudan, tasked with gathering actionable intelligence and sharing information. Furthermore, the Joint Information Operations Centre in Dungu would be strengthened. The meeting also called for the mobilization of funds to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians affected by LRA violence.

30. From 16 March to 5 April 2011, an African Union technical mission visited the four LRA-affected countries to discuss the implementation of the recommendations made at the Bangui meeting, particularly the establishment of the regional intervention force and centres for sharing information. The findings of the mission were addressed at a meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the four LRA-affected countries in Addis Ababa on 8 June and endorsed at the African Union summit held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, on 30 June 2011. The Assembly of Heads of State requested the African Union Peace and Security Council to act swiftly on the recommendations.

31. The Peace and Security Council met in Addis Ababa on 27 September 2011 and received an update from the African Union Commission on the planning for the

implementation of the Ministers' recommendations. In its communiqué, the Council requested the Commission to report on the implementation of the African Union regional cooperation initiative for the elimination of LRA to enable it to authorize the operations of the regional intervention force. It also called for the United Nations and other partners to support the initiative, in particular through the provision of financial and logistical support.

32. The Integrated Core Planning Team, established by the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa, is developing modalities of the African Union initiative with the support of planners from UNOAU and other United Nations entities. In particular, the draft mission plan, logistics arrangements and a strategy for the protection of civilians have, inter alia, been developed for the regional intervention force. A further technical assessment mission to the LRA-affected countries is expected to take place in the coming months, and the regional intervention force is expected to become operational in 2012. However, a number of challenges are impeding the creation of the regional intervention force, including the outstanding appointment of the Special Envoy, the clarification of command and control arrangements, and the mobilization of the necessary resources for the force to be deployed in a timely fashion and to become fully operational.

33. On 24 May 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (United States Public Law 111-172). On 24 November 2010, his Government submitted a strategy to address LRA to the United States Congress. The strategy comprises several pillars, including increased protection of civilians; promoting justice and reconciliation in the LRA-affected region; apprehension or removal from the battlefield of Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders; promoting the defection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and increased humanitarian access and continued provision of relief to affected communities.

34. On 14 October 2011, President Obama notified the United States Congress of the deployment of 100 combat-equipped military personnel to the Central African region. The team would include advisers to "partner nations' forces" that are working towards the removal from the battlefield of Joseph Kony and other senior leaders of LRA and associated headquarters, logistical and communications personnel. He noted that the personnel would provide information, advice and assistance to the regional forces and would deploy in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Uganda, subject to the approval of the respective Governments. Furthermore, they would not engage the LRA forces unless fired upon.

V. United Nations activities in response to the Lord's Resistance Army

Regional coordination efforts

35. The United Nations peace operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Sudan have met periodically, including in June 2010 at the Heads of Mission level, and have taken steps to improve information sharing and coordination to better address LRA threat. This has included establishing focal points on the LRA within the respective Missions and

establishing a coordination cell based in MONUSCO. Likewise, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has strengthened the exchange of humanitarian information on LRA-related incidents and population movements between the humanitarian country teams in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Uganda. Meanwhile, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), working with other partners, has begun preparing a report on human rights violations committed by LRA in the areas affected by the group with a view to assisting the national authorities, the United Nations and civil society in addressing the human rights dimension of the LRA problem in a more integrated manner.

36. From 16 to 27 May 2011, the United Nations conducted a multidisciplinary evaluation mission to the affected countries and met with the African Union in Addis Ababa. The Mission assessed developments regarding LRA since the 2008 negotiations and reviewed national, regional and international efforts to respond to the LRA challenge, as well as the United Nations responses and capacities in the region. The findings and recommendations of the Mission were reflected in the decision to strengthen United Nations support for the proposed African Union regional strategy and the efforts of LRA-affected countries, as well as to improve the alignment and the coordination of the United Nations efforts in order to maximize the impact of the Organization's collective response.

37. On 2 March 2011, UNOCA was established in Libreville. The Office will support the efforts of countries in the Central African region to consolidate peace, prevent conflict, and tackle cross-border challenges to peace and stability. UNOCA is also tasked to act as the United Nations regional political focal point for the LRA issue. In this regard, my Special Representative for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA has held consultations with regional leaders, the African Union and United Nations presences in the LRA-affected countries on the way forward with regard to addressing the LRA threat.

38. On 10 and 11 October 2011, UNOCA hosted a meeting of the United Nations presences in the Central African countries to discuss ways of strengthening a coordinated approach to United Nations support for peace endeavours in the region, and more actively addressing cross-border threats to regional security, including LRA.

39. In Addis Ababa, UNOAU coordinates closely with UNOCA and the other United Nations entities and the African Union on LRA issues. It is working closely with the African Union in providing planning support for the African Union's Integrated Core Planning Team. UNOAU also coordinates closely with UNOCA on political issues related to LRA. MONUSCO and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) also have military planners on standby to provide assistance, as required. Close coordination between United Nations peacekeeping operations in the region and the regional intervention force will be important for the success of the African Union initiative.

40. The child protection components of MONUSCO, UNMISS, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) country offices in the region have continued to collaborate on matters of common concern with regard to LRA. The collaboration is achieved through a network established and managed by the UNICEF office in Uganda, with the support of UNICEF headquarters and the Office

of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. The network ensures coordination on operational matters, including those relating to the release and repatriation of children abducted by LRA, as well as on regional monitoring and reporting of abuses committed against children by LRA to the Security Council Working Group on children and armed conflict. A large network of information sources related to children has been established, drawing on local organizations, international NGOs and United Nations personnel deployed in LRA-affected areas.

41. In response to concerns expressed by child protection actors with regard to the UPDF's handling of children formerly associated with LRA, UPDF has established standard operating procedures for the reception and handover of children and women separated from LRA as a result of military operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. The standard operating procedures envision the prompt transfer of children and women to international child protection agencies for care and repatriation, where appropriate. The practical modalities for the implementation of the standard operating procedures are currently under discussion by UPDF and the United Nations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Uganda.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

42. In keeping with its mandate, MONUSCO focuses primarily on enhancing the protection of civilians against the threat posed by LRA in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Towards this end, approximately 1,200 MONUSCO troops are deployed in Haut Uélé, comprising an infantry battalion and a Special Forces company, along with three military utility helicopters. In addition, military engineer units are opening up key axis in support of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including roads from Dungu to Faradje and from Dungu to Duru. Some local government offices in Dungu have also been rehabilitated.

43. The Rudia Umbrella military operation undertaken by MONUSCO since April 2009, mainly in Haut Uélé but also in Bas Uélé, in coordination with some 5,000 FARDC troops deployed in the area, has included a series of operations aimed at protecting civilians and deterring LRA attacks. In June, MONUSCO completed the deployment of a United States-trained FARDC battalion to Dungu, and provides logistic support to the FARDC troops conducting operations against LRA, in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.

44. MONUSCO has established a number of forward operating bases from which it conducts day and night patrols and carried out a range of protection activities, including market escorts and escorting farmers to their fields. In December 2010 MONUSCO conducted operations in the areas of Duru, Bangadi, Ngilima and Niangara in Haut Uélé, aimed at deterring any large end-of-year LRA attacks, such as had occurred in 2008 and 2009.

45. Since MONUSCO set up its base in Dungu in July 2007, it has carried out a campaign to encourage LRA combatants to defect and enter the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme. This disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration unit produces leaflets in local languages, and the armies operating in the affected areas

in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan are involved in their distribution. The unit has also worked to establish or enhance regional FM and shortwave radio stations in Obo, Central African Republic, Yambio and Ezo, South Sudan, and Dungu and Faradje, Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUSCO has also enhanced the community alert network run by the Catholic church in Haut Uélé and Bas Uélé, which enables communities to inform local authorities and/or MONUSCO of an impending or actual attack. To date, 25 high-frequency radios have been installed in communities as part of the initiative.

46. The MONUSCO disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration unit has repatriated over 100 LRA elements to Uganda, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Meanwhile, many more LRA escapees, who were sensitized by disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration messaging, have self-repatriated or were repatriated by other actors, such as UPDF. Most elements who have been debriefed report that the messaging positively affected their decision to escape.

47. About 20 international NGOs, 8 United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of national NGOs provide humanitarian assistance in the LRA-affected areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They respond to the most urgent humanitarian needs in priority sectors out of hubs in Bunia, Dungu and Ango. In 2011, the humanitarian presence was strengthened in Bas Uélé, including through a $4.4 million allocation from the pooled fund in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and additional funding received through the Central Emergency Response Fund. Humanitarian actors have also contributed to the establishment of early warning systems in close collaboration with local communities. Other humanitarian activities include assistance to victims of sexual violence and other attacks.

48. In addition, together with key partners, including ICRC, United Nations child protection officers assist children who escape from LRA, and facilitate their repatriation and reunification with their families. Where capacities exist, MONUSCO facilitates the transport of these children to their country of origin. While awaiting transport, and upon arrival in their countries of origin, the children are housed in transit centres in Bunia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yambio and Juba, South Sudan, and Gulu, Uganda.

49. The remote and insecure nature of the LRA-affected areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo makes it extremely difficult and costly for humanitarian organizations to establish and maintain access to populations in need of assistance. Road networks are limited, necessitating aerial bridges for the transport of humanitarian staff and goods. Humanitarian agencies and MONUSCO have rehabilitated a number of roads, but the rainy season and insecurity still make many areas inaccessible. Populations receiving assistance are also sometimes at risk of being looted by LRA or Congolese security forces. In this regard, humanitarian organizations have applied the "do no harm" approach and placed restrictions on their activities where deemed necessary.

Central African Republic

50. There is limited United Nations presence in LRA-affected areas, including the Obo Area. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) ended in December 2010, and its peacekeepers withdrew from Vakaga prefecture, where LRA has been present. An assessment mission is expected to be deployed to Mbomou and Haut Mbomou to assess the security situation with a view to establishing an office of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the coming months.

51. BINUCA established a working group to strengthen coordination and share information on LRA-related issues comprising Government officials, subregional and regional organizations, the international community and the United Nations country team. The Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic has been requested to join the working group as an observer.

52. Fifteen United Nations agencies and NGOs are providing food, shelter and medical support to IDPs in four sites in urban areas in LRA-affected areas. The IDP-hosting populations, which have been severely affected through the strain on local resources, are also provided with assistance. The humanitarian response in the region has been increased recently, but is mainly restricted to urban areas and should be extended to villages with additional long-term development assistance. Humanitarian access is, however, a major challenge. The security situation remains precarious and the movement of humanitarian staff by road is rare and requires armed escorts from FACA, making costly air travel the only option in many instances.

South Sudan

53. UNMISS, which was established in July 2011, is mandated to coordinate with the Government of South Sudan and regional actors with a view to improving the protection of civilians in areas affected by LRA activity. Towards that end, UNMISS is building upon the work of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to increase its military and civilian efforts regarding LRA.

54. UNMISS, in coordination with UPDF and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is providing medical assistance to children rescued from LRA by UPDF during military operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. Also, UNMISS coordinates with UPDF and the South Sudan Police Service regarding the repatriation of former abductees to Uganda.

55. Five United Nations agencies, eight NGOs, the International Organization for Migration and ICRC provide health, food, shelter, water, sanitation and education services in the LRA-affected areas. In May, a food security assessment mission conducted by humanitarian partners recommended that a three-month food ration be provided to some 7,300 persons displaced since January until the first harvest in August. Food assistance to the long-term displaced will be phased out in line with the Government policy to reduce dependency on external assistance.

56. On 23 September the Council of Ministers in South Sudan passed a new disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy, establishing the legal

foundation of the future national programme, which will, inter alia, support former combatants on foreign soil, including former LRA combatants. The new programme will provide assistance to, among others, LRA abductees, including non-South Sudanese citizens. In addition to joint monitoring, inter-mission cooperation between MONUSCO and UNMISS, in conjunction with the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, continues on the repatriation of former LRA elements, the most recent group of whom returned to Sudan on 8 September. In addition, UNICEF has supported the training of 22 national and international protection partners on the monitoring and reporting of LRA incidents in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal States.

Uganda

57. Building upon its significant recovery and development programme and its extensive field presence in northern Uganda, the United Nations country team has collectively embarked upon a dedicated peacebuilding programme funded by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. The programme addresses issues that contribute to conflict and fosters those actors and dynamics that promote peace. The joint programme is carried out by nine United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and provides specialized reintegration and integration assistance for female-headed, IDP, returnee and ex-combatants' households. The programme also provides psychosocial support and interim care, and supports the reunification of children formerly associated with armed groups and other children affected by violence. OHCHR further assists the Government of Uganda in developing transitional justice mechanisms in conformity with international human rights standards and facilitates capacities for mediation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

58. With regard to protection activities, UNHCR will be phasing out its operations by 31 December 2011. The Uganda Human Rights Commission will take over from UNHCR, and has already begun implementing protection monitoring and human rights promotion activities. Furthermore, the Uganda Human Rights Commission is expected to continue efforts at resolving the long-outstanding land issues.

VI. Observations and recommendations

59. I remain concerned about the brutal and indiscriminate nature of LRA's ongoing attacks on civilians, which have resulted in deaths, abductions, looting and the displacement of some 440,000 people in the affected countries. LRA has split into small autonomous groups operating in remote areas where there is little or no Government presence in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. While the attacks continue, it is difficult to assess the exact capabilities and strength of LRA.

60. LRA is a serious transnational threat in the Central African region, which, despite having no clear political agenda, continues to perpetrate serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and instil terror and fear in local populations. I reiterate the call for decisive and timely action to eliminate this threat, arrest leaders indicted by the International Criminal Court and effectively address the challenges posed by the activities of the group.

61. The Governments of the LRA-affected countries have the primary responsibility to lead and coordinate measures to eliminate the LRA threat. They have taken important steps in this regard, including through coordinated military operations against the group. Such steps must continue. However, the national security forces of these countries lack the full range of resources and capabilities in areas such as logistics, intelligence gathering and air power, to effectively deal with the problem on their own. I therefore urge relevant partners to provide the necessary support to their efforts, including with respect to timely information sharing on the whereabouts of LRA groups. It is also important that any military action against LRA be carried out in compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.

62. The overall capacity of affected States to extend their authority throughout their respective territories, protect the civilian populations and enforce the rule of law must be strengthened on an urgent basis. It is no coincidence that most LRA attacks have been reported in remote areas with little or no State presence. I urge the national authorities of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan to enhance their efforts to extend the presence of State authorities, particularly with respect to civilian administration, security forces and rule of law institutions. The United Nations presences in the four LRA-affected countries will strengthen their support to these national efforts, and I urge donors to provide the necessary funding for these initiatives as well.

63. I welcome the initiative of the African Union to develop a regional strategy to address LRA, as it provides an important opportunity for taking coordinated action. I urge the African Union to work with the LRA-affected countries to finalize and implement the regional strategy as soon as possible. In particular, I encourage the African Union to expedite the appointment of the African Union Special Envoy for the LRA-affected Areas and complete the planning and operationalizing of the regional intervention force. The United Nations stands ready to support the regional strategy of the African Union through the United Nations presences in the region. I encourage the wider international community to also support the efforts of the African Union in this regard.

64. The longer-term military objective of eradicating the LRA threat should not detract from the immediate need to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of LRA attacks. The threat LRA poses should not be assessed on the basis of its size or military capability, but of the scale of the attacks it has carried out against civilians and the humanitarian and human rights consequences for the victims. The humanitarian crisis caused by the armed group has not received adequate attention from the international community, and its response urgently needs scaling-up. Appropriate rehabilitation needs to be provided to victims of LRA attacks. I urge donors to strengthen their commitment to humanitarian partners in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan in support of these efforts.

65. I commend Uganda and the United Nations agencies that have been working on the standard operating procedures adopted by UPDF on the release and handover of children. I encourage the national security forces of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan to adopt similar standard operating procedures and implement them in close collaboration with United Nations child protection agencies.

66. I encourage Member States and other actors to ensure specific monitoring, analysis and reporting in all the affected countries and develop a system of cross-border information sharing, especially relating to atrocities committed against women and children, rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage. Provision should be made for adequate resources for medical, psychosocial and other programmatic interventions for survivors, including reparations and other remedies, as appropriate.

67. I call upon all parties to provide safe and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations to the affected populations. LRA poses a significant security threat to humanitarian organizations, and the remoteness and logistical obstacles of reaching many locations makes operations costly and time-consuming. More must be done to provide assistance to those most in need.

68. While LRA combatants attempting to leave the group face several risks and challenges, I encourage the Governments of the affected countries to continue their efforts to facilitate defections of LRA combatants and their reintegration. I also welcome the efforts of international partners in that regard.

69. I call on the LRA-affected countries to take the necessary national measures to prevent impunity and strengthen the rule of law. Holding perpetrators accountable for the crimes they commit is an important deterrent to the commission of future crimes. The arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court with regard to senior LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony, should be acted upon without delay. In this regard, I welcome steps taken by the Government of Uganda to end impunity for international crimes and human rights violations committed by LRA elements. However, consideration should be given to amending the Ugandan Amnesty Act in order to ensure that it meets international standards.

70. The United Nations system is taking necessary actions to address the LRA problem in a more effective manner through its political, peacekeeping, human rights, humanitarian and development efforts in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Uganda. In this connection, I am pleased to report that steps have been taken to enhance coordination and synergy among the United Nations entities, including with UNOAU and UNOCA.

71. I have also encouraged the strengthening of United Nations peacekeeping capacities within their mandates and capabilities in strategic locations in the LRA-affected areas that would help deter attacks against civilians and facilitate humanitarian operations. The United Nations peacekeeping missions in the region are, however, constrained by limited resources, competing mandated priorities, and operating areas that are confined by national borders.

72. Furthermore, I have tasked UNOCA, in its capacity as the United Nations political focal point for LRA in the region, and in close cooperation with all relevant United Nations presences on the ground, to enhance the linkages in the work of the United Nations and other partners and facilitate coordination and information sharing among them.

United Nations S/2011/694

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 November 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1972 (2011), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Emergency Relief Coordinator on the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the latter resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) H. S. **Puri**
Chairman
Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea

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Annex

Letter dated 3 November 2011 from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1972 (2011), I have the honour to transmit the report of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia (see enclosure).

The humanitarian community working in Somalia wishes to advise that it maintains the definition of "implementing partner", as defined in the first report of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), as follows:

> "Implementing partner", a non-governmental organization or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another non-governmental organization and that reports, when requested, to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:
>
> (a) The organization is part of the consolidated appeals process for Somalia (or the common humanitarian fund process);
>
> (b) The organization is represented in a cluster's 3W matrix (*Who does What and Where*).

I would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its attachment, could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Valerie **Amos**
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Enclosure

Report of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator

I. Introduction

1. The present report is the fourth submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 1972 (2011), the successor resolution to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010). The Security Council, in paragraph 5 of resolution 1972 (2011) requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 November 2011 on the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution, and any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, through the support of United Nations agencies and organizations having observer status with the General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance.

2. This fourth report covers the period from April to November 2011. It focuses primarily on the regions of Somalia under the control of Al-Shabaab, which was listed, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, on 12 April 2010.

3. As in the previous three reports (S/2010/372, S/2010/580 and S/2011/125), the present report outlines constraints to humanitarian access and their operational implications, as well as the mitigation measures that have been put in place to address politicization, misuse, and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance.

4. During the reporting period, the security environment throughout Somalia varied by region and occasionally even by district. The north and north-east areas of Somalia remained generally stable with pockets of tension due to targeted assassinations of businessmen and administration officials, or occasional clan clashes. South and central Somalia, including Mogadishu, remained volatile, with brief but violent clashes taking place between a number of actors, including Transitional Federal Government troops, Transitional Federal Government-aligned forces, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama, and Al-Shabaab. On 16 October 2011, Kenyan forces entered Somalia. A press statement issued by the Office of the Government Spokesperson of Kenya on 27 October stated that the objective of the military operation was to pursue and curtail the operation of Al-Shabaab, which had become a threat to Kenya's security and economy.

5. As stated in the previous report (S/2011/125), central and southern Somalia remain the epicentre of the drought and famine crisis. While access remains difficult, it has been possible to deliver humanitarian assistance to most regions of the country, including those areas affected by famine.

II. Constraints on humanitarian access and their operational implications

6. Somalia continues to experience a protracted and complex humanitarian emergency. Most areas of the south remain under the control of non-State armed groups. These are also the areas with the most humanitarian needs, apart from some

border areas and Mogadishu. The majority of the border areas with Kenya are controlled by armed groups affiliated with the Transitional Federal Government. Insecurity remains high in areas under the control of both anti-government and pro-government groups, undermining humanitarian access. Displaced people are also constantly on the move due to insecurity. Famine in the last four months further increased the number of displaced people.

7. On 6 August 2011, Al-Shabaab publicly announced that it would withdraw from nearly all parts of Mogadishu, but that it would continue to attack the Transitional Federal Government forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Since Al-Shabaab's withdrawal, there has been a noted increase in vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, improvised explosive devices, and hand grenade attacks. The conflict had a significant impact on the population during the reporting period. The World Health Organization (WHO) recorded 7,426 casualties in the three main hospitals in Mogadishu from March to mid-October 2011, with a peak of 1,590 casualties in May.

8. Until the second quarter of the year, conflict remained the main reason for displacement. From June onward, drought and famine became the major reason for displacement. In July over 55,000 internal displacements were recorded. Mogadishu, for example, received an average of 1,000 new arrivals a day in July and August. Others fled to neighbouring countries: 294,000 Somalis became refugees during the reporting period.

9. The failure of the rains from April to June 2011, coupled with the previous season's insufficient rains, led to crop failure, livestock deaths, and an increase in water and cereal prices. The consequent drought led to the declaration of famine in two areas of southern Somalia (Lower Shabelle and parts of Bakool) in July and affected more than 350,000 people. By the beginning of September, the famine had spread to four more areas (the Bay region, parts of Middle Shabelle, internally displaced person (IDP) areas in the Afgooye Corridor and in Mogadishu), increasing the number of people at risk of dying to around 750,000.

10. Due to the famine and the prolonged conflict, the number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance increased from 2.4 million in March to 4 million in September 2011. Three quarters of the 4 million people in crisis in Somalia live in southern Somalia. The number of malnourished children in Somalia also grew from 390,000 to 450,000, 75 per cent residing in southern regions. Malnutrition rates in parts of the south are alarming. In the Bay region, for example, global acute malnutrition rates reached 58 per cent.

11. Unimpeded humanitarian access to populations in crisis in southern Somalia was not secured. The limited access granted was a result of lengthy negotiations. Despite access constraints, humanitarian organizations had been able to scale up their activities since famine was declared. During the reporting period, roughly 900 national and international United Nations staff were in Somalia at any given time, and there was a 30 per cent increase in the number of staff in Mogadishu as of June.

12. The current scaling up of activities is being assisted by a number of new humanitarian actors that until now had very limited or no presence in Somalia. While the majority of the new actors are operating in Mogadishu, a number of them are also working in areas controlled by non-State armed groups. This improved presence has increased the overall capacity to respond to humanitarian needs.

13. Since July, the number of beneficiaries receiving food assistance tripled, from 770,000 to 2.2 million people; 77 per cent of beneficiaries were in the south. Partners working in the sectors of water, hygiene and sanitation also scaled up interventions: the number of beneficiaries reached with sustainable water interventions increased from 658,000 people between January and July to nearly 1.1 million people by September; and 1.8 million people benefited from emergency water interventions by the end of September. Health partners distributed 79,000 long-lasting insecticide-treated nets to 39,500 households to reduce the spread of malaria. By October, an estimated 391,000 children were admitted for treatment of severe and moderate acute malnutrition, and blanket supplementary feeding to families with malnourished children under the age of five had reached over 85,000 households (approximately 512,000 people). Health facilities were also equipped with 1 million rapid diagnostic tests and 560,000 doses of antimalarial drugs. Over 755,000 children under the age of 15 were vaccinated against measles in Mogadishu and in accessible districts of Gedo and Bakool. Roughly 13,000 households in south Somalia received cash transfers and/or food vouchers.

III. Risk mitigation measures

14. In resolution 1972 (2011), the Security Council called on Member States and the United Nations to take all possible steps to mitigate the politicization, the misuse and the misappropriation of humanitarian assistance, and requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report by 15 November (2011) and again by 15 July 2012 on the implementation of such measures. The Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, on behalf of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, surveyed organizations operating in Somalia on the mitigation measures that the humanitarian community has adopted.

15. The United Nations country team adopted an enterprise risk management framework to be used by all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes working on Somalia (including those providing humanitarian and development assistance). Since the last report, the United Nations country team formally established a Risk Management Unit comprised of two staff and headed by a Risk Manager. The primary focus of the Unit is to facilitate effective, efficient and harmonized assistance to the people of Somalia while mitigating risks associated with the delivery of assistance.

16. An information and communications technology (database) analyst in the Risk Management Unit provides dedicated capacity to support, maintain and further develop the Contractor Information Management System. Since the last report, the System has been populated by seven United Nations country team members, and now includes over 1,000 individual contractor entities. The System will also be linked to relevant Security Council resolution sanction lists, such as those with regard to resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1267 (1999), to better support and enhance the United Nations country team's due diligence processes.

17. The Risk Management Unit is actively involved in promoting enterprise risk management in Somalia, as well as throughout the wider United Nations system and with the international community. Additional risk management training was provided to United Nations employees in Somalia, as well as to key implementing partners and donors and Transitional Federal Government employees. Since the last

report, an additional 100 people have been trained, bringing the total number trained to over 250 people throughout Somalia (Mogadishu, Garowe, Galkayo, Boosaaso, Hargeisa) and in Nairobi. The Risk Manager also undertook a mission to Afghanistan to encourage the creation of a Risk Management Unit and is supporting the implementation of enterprise risk management at United Nations Headquarters.

18. Many organizations implementing humanitarian projects rely, at least partially, on remote management and monitoring. Recognizing the need to uphold the integrity and the accountability of the Common Humanitarian Fund, two key measures are being implemented to mitigate the risk of misuse of funds. First, use of the Contractor Information Management System has enabled the United Nations country team to identify which agencies and contractors are working in Somalia, to see the activities they are carrying out, and to check references. Second, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs plans to conduct an external audit of all NGO-funded projects, including field visits to a number of projects.

19. The humanitarian community has continued to strengthen accountability and monitoring mechanisms at the country level. For example, satellite imagery is increasingly used to verify the implementation of projects. One of the largest clusters also received funding through the Common Humanitarian Fund to pilot the monitoring of cluster achievements. The Fund has also employed a dedicated staff member based in Somalia to monitor a number of its funded projects. To further strengthen monitoring, the Fund conducts a lessons learned exercise after each standard allocation.

20. The continued support of donors to the Common Humanitarian Fund reflects their confidence in the Fund's accountability: the Fund was established in 2010 with an allocation of $20 million; since the beginning of the year, $73 million has been allocated to it. Roughly 72 per cent of that funding has been committed to projects assisting people in central and southern Somalia.

21. The survey undertaken by the Humanitarian Coordinator, as referred to in paragraph 14, did not reveal any instances of misuse or misappropriation of assistance. One instance of politicization was identified: an organization reported that the local administration was blocking the recruitment of additional staff, as well as the implementation of certain projects. The matter remains unresolved.

22. Organizations responding to the survey stated that they continue to use and refine mitigation measures. All respondents, for example, screen one or more of the following against United Nations sanctions lists: national or international staff, implementing partners, or contractors.

23. In addition to the measures outlined in the previous reports, organizations are increasing the regular reporting requirements for their staff and implementing partners, particularly during the current famine crisis. In order to assure greater accountability, some organizations have also begun embedding their own staff with their implementing partners to take responsibility for logistics, finance and reporting. One organization reported that it had employed a compliance officer dedicated to its Somalia operation.

IV. The impact of resolutions 1916 (2010) and 1972 (2011)

24. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010) and its successor, resolution 1972 (2011), views on the impact of the resolutions on donor funding are variable. The general consensus seems to be that though funding delays occurred initially, the resolutions have had a limited impact on stopping funding overall. The perception of some organizations is that the humanitarian exemption clause in the resolutions has enabled them to continue to operate, particularly in central and southern Somalia. There is general agreement that Member States' national counter-terrorism legislation has had greater impact on the ability to access funds.

25. With respect to the impact of the resolutions on organizations operating in Somalia, the survey revealed that most do not consider that the resolutions have had a significant impact on their humanitarian operations. This is in line with the conclusions of previous surveys for reports pursuant Security Council resolution 1916 (2010).

V. Conclusion

26. The majority of Somalia's population remains in need of humanitarian assistance. The majority of people in need reside in areas under the control of non-State armed groups listed under Security Council resolutions. Risks associated with delivering humanitarian assistance remain high in these areas, as well as in other parts of Somalia. Risk management and mitigation measures have improved since the first report to the Security Council and are constantly being revised to respond to the changing and complex environment in Somalia.

United Nations S/2011/695

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 November 2011

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 6335th meeting, held on 9 June 2010 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 8 November 2011 (see annex).

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Annex

Letter dated 8 November 2011 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1929 (2010), which I have submitted today to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and the enclosed report to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure*

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement[1] and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).

2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions[2] are binding on Iran.[3] The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.[4]

3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,[5] the Agency is required to cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council's responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. All Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council,[6] and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

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* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/2011/65.

[1] The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

[2] The Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); and GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).

[3] In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran's obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras 1-6).

[4] The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).

[5] The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957, following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A.

[6] The Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.

4. In a letter dated 26 May 2011, H.E. Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), informed the Director General that Iran would be prepared to receive relevant questions from the Agency on its nuclear activities after a declaration by the Agency that the workplan (INFCIRC/711) had been fully implemented and that the Agency would thereafter implement safeguards in Iran in a routine manner. In his reply of 3 June 2011, the Director General informed Dr Abbasi that the Agency was neither in a position to make such a declaration, nor to conduct safeguards in Iran in a routine manner, in light of concerns about the existence in Iran of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. On 19 September 2011, the Director General met Dr. Abbasi in Vienna, and discussed issues related to the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and other relevant obligations. In a letter dated 30 September 2011, the Agency reiterated its invitation to Iran to re-engage with the Agency on the outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and the actions required of Iran to resolve those issues. In a letter dated 30 October 2011, Dr Abbasi referred to his previous discussions with the Director General and expressed the will of Iran "to remove ambiguities, if any", suggesting that the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG), should visit Iran for discussions. In his reply, dated 2 November 2011, the Director General indicated his preparedness to send the DDG-SG to "discuss the issues identified" in his forthcoming report to the Board of Governors.

5. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/54, 2 September 2011), as well as issues of longer standing, and, in line with the Director General's opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, contains an Annex setting out in more detail the basis for the Agency's concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. The report focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

B. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

6. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).[7] Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to implement safeguards at these facilities and LOFs.

C. Enrichment Related Activities

7. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the following declared facilities, all of which are nevertheless under Agency safeguards.

[7] All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

C.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant

8. **Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP):** There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been provided for Production Hall B.

9. As of 2 November 2011, 54 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A, 37 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF_6.[8] Whereas initially each installed cascade comprised 164 centrifuges, Iran has subsequently modified 15 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges each. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 2 November 2011, installation work in the remaining five units was ongoing, but no centrifuges had been installed, and there had been no installation work in Production Hall B.

10. Between 15 October and 8 November 2011, the Agency conducted a physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP, the results of which the Agency is currently evaluating.

11. Iran has estimated that, between 18 October 2010 and 1 November 2011, it produced 1787 kg of low enriched UF_6, which would result in a total production of 4922 kg of low enriched UF_6 since production began in February 2007.[9] The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.[10] The consequences for safeguards of the seal breakage in the feed and withdrawal area[11] will be evaluated by the Agency upon completion of its assessment of the PIV.

12. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 2007[12] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).

13. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP):** PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).

14. In the production area, Iran first began feeding low enriched UF_6 into Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010, for the stated purpose of producing UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).[13],[14] Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF_6 into two

[8] The 54 installed cascades contained approximately 8000 centrifuges; the 37 cascades declared by Iran as being fed with UF_6 on that date contained 6208 centrifuges. Not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF_6 may have been working.

[9] The Agency previously verified that, as of 17 October 2010, a total of 3135 kg of low enriched UF_6 had been produced since the start of operations in February 2007 (GOV/2011/29, para. 9).

[10] In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not subject to containment and surveillance.

[11] GOV/2011/29, para. 10.

[12] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 6 March 2011.

[13] GOV/2010/28, para. 9.

[14] TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges.[15]

15. Between 13 and 29 September 2011, the Agency conducted a PIV at PFEP and verified that, as of 13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of low enriched UF_6 had been fed into the cascade(s) in the production area since the process began on 9 February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the results of the PIV. Iran has estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of 44.7 kg of UF_6 enriched at FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 6 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced.

16. The preliminary results of the PIV show an improvement to the operator's weighing system. Once the assessment of the PIV has been completed, the Agency will be able to determine whether the operator's better sampling procedures have resulted in a more accurate determination of the level of U-235 enrichment.[16]

17. In the R&D area, as of 22 October 2011, Iran had installed 164 IR-2m centrifuges in Cascade 5,[17] all of which were under vacuum, and 66 IR-4 centrifuges in Cascade 4, none of which had been fed with UF_6. In Cascades 2 and 3, Iran has been feeding natural UF_6 into single machines, 10-machine cascades and 20-machine cascades of IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges.

18. Between 21 August 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of approximately 59.8 kg of natural UF_6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails are recombined at the end of the process.

19. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP[18] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the DIQ.

C.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

20. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. In its DIQ of 10 October 2009, Iran stated that the purpose of the facility was the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235, and that the facility was being built to contain 16 cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.[19]

21. In September 2010, Iran provided the Agency with a revised DIQ in which it stated that the purpose of FFEP was to include R&D as well as the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.

22. As previously reported, Iran provided the Agency with another revised DIQ in June 2011 in which the stated purpose of FFEP was the production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, as well as R&D. Iran informed the Agency that initially this production would take place within two sets of two interconnected cascades, and that each of these cascades would consist of 174 centrifuges. Iran was reported to

[15] GOV/2010/28, para. 9.
[16] GOV/2011/29, para. 14; GOV/2011/54, para. 15.
[17] Iran had previously indicated its intention to install two 164-centrifuge cascades (Cascades 4 and 5) in the R&D area (GOV/2011/7, para. 17).
[18] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 5 March 2011.
[19] GOV/2009/74, para. 9.

have decided to "triple its (production) capacity", after which Iran would stop the "20% fuel production" at Natanz.[20]

23. On 17 October 2011, as anticipated in its letter to the Agency dated 11 October 2011, Iran transferred from FEP to FFEP one large cylinder containing LEU in the form of UF_6 and one small cylinder containing depleted uranium (DU) in the form of UF_6. According to Iran, the LEU will be used for feeding and the DU will be used for line passivation. On 24 October 2011, the Agency detached the seal on the cylinder containing the DU, and the cylinder was immobilized at the feeding station. At the request of Iran, the Agency will detach the seal on the cylinder containing the LEU on 8 November 2011, and the cylinder will be immobilized at the feeding station.

24. During an inspection on 23 and 24 October 2011, the Agency verified that Iran had installed all 174 centrifuges in each of two cascades, neither of which had been connected to the cooling and electrical lines, and had installed 64 centrifuges in a third cascade. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. Iran informed the Agency that the main power supply had been connected to the facility. No centrifuges had been installed in the area designated for R&D purposes.

25. The Agency continues to verify that FFEP is being constructed according to the latest DIQ provided by Iran. As previously reported, although Iran has provided some clarification regarding the initial timing of, and circumstances relating to, its decision to build FFEP at an existing defence establishment, additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility.[21]

26. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.[22]

C.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities

27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of this Iranian year.[23,24] In August 2011, Dr. Abbasi was reported as having said that Iran did not need to build new enrichment facilities during the next two years.[25] Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.[26] As a result of Iran's lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.

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[20] Dr. Fereydoun Abbasi, 'Iran to Triple Production of 20%-Enriched Uranium', Fars News Agency, 8 June 2011.

[21] GOV/2011/29, para. 20.

[22] The results did show a small number of particles of depleted uranium (GOV/2010/10, para. 17).

[23] 'Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites', Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.

[24] GOV/2010/46, para. 33.

[25] 'Iran atomic chief says fuel swap talks over: IRNA', Agence France Press article of 31 August 2011, citing remarks made by Dr Abbasi during an interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency.

[26] Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255 .

D. Reprocessing Activities

28. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.[27] In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it "does not have reprocessing activities". In that context, the Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.[28] The Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 15 October 2011, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 16 October 2011. It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.

E. Heavy Water Related Projects

29. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is subject to Agency safeguards.[29]

30. On 17 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that construction of the facility was ongoing and the coolant heat exchangers had been installed. According to Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.

31. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency, in a letter to Iran dated 20 October 2011, requested further access to HWPP. The Agency has yet to receive a reply to that letter, and is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the HWPP appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency access to the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples.[30]

F. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

32. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan which, as described below, are in contravention of those obligations, although both facilities are under Agency safeguards.

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[27] S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

[28] The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.

[29] S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

[30] GOV/2010/10, paras. 20 and 21.

33. **Uranium Conversion Facility:** On 18 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF during which the Agency observed the ongoing installation of the process equipment for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8. During the DIV, Iran informed the Agency that the initial tests of this conversion line, originally scheduled to start on 6 September 2011, had been postponed and would not involve the use of nuclear material.

34. As previously reported, Iran informed the Agency in July 2011 that it would start R&D activities at UCF for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO_2. During the aforementioned DIV, Iran informed the Agency that 6.8 kg of DU in the form of UF_6 had been processed and that Iran had produced 113 g of uranium in the form of UO_2 that met its specifications. According to Iran, this UO_2 has been sent to FMP to produce test pellets. Iran has also started using UF_6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 to produce UO_2. During the DIV, Iran further informed the Agency that this UO_2 would also be sent to FMP to produce fuel pellets, which would then be sent to TRR for "performance test studies".

35. In a letter dated 4 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency of the postponement of the production of natural UF_6, involving the use of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant, originally scheduled to restart on 23 October 2011. In a letter dated 11 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that, from 11 November 2011, it intended to use UOC produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant for the production of natural uranium in the form of UO_2. During the DIV on 18 October 2011, the Agency took a sample of this UOC. During the same DIV, Iran informed the Agency that, since 23 July 2011, it had fed into the process 958.7 kg of uranium in the form of UOC[31] and produced about 185.6 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO_2, and further indicated that some of the product had been fed back into the process. In a letter dated 8 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that it had transferred about 1 kg of this UO_2 to the R&D section of FMP in order to "conduct research activities and pellet fabrication".

36. **Fuel Manufacturing Plant:** As previously reported, in a DIQ for FMP dated 31 May 2011, Iran informed the Agency that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO_2 manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR for irradiation and post-irradiation analysis. On 15 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR and confirmed that, on 23 August 2011, Iran had started to irradiate a prototype fuel rod containing natural UO_2 that had been manufactured at FMP. In a letter dated 30 August 2011, Iran informed the Agency that "for the time being" it had no plans to conduct any destructive testing on the rod and that only non-destructive testing would be conducted at TRR.

37. On 22 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iran had started to install some equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR.[32] During the inspection, the Agency verified five fuel plates containing natural U3O8 that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at FMP for testing purposes.

[31] This was taken from Iran's stockpile of imported UOC (GOV/2003/75, Annex I, para. 8).

[32] GOV/2010/46, para. 26.

G. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.[33] Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

39. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.[34] In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran's obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.[35] Since August 2008, Iran has not engaged with the Agency in any substantive way on this matter.

40. The Director General, in his opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, stated that in the near future he hoped to set out in greater detail the basis for the Agency's concerns so that all Member States would be kept fully informed. In line with that statement, the Annex to this report provides a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency to date which has given rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

41. The analysis itself is based on a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation in all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. This approach involves, inter alia, the identification of indicators of the existence or development of the processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.

42. The information which serves as the basis for the Agency's analysis and concerns, as identified in the Annex, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency's own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved, and time frames.

43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

- Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);

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[33] GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras. 40-45; GOV/2009/55, paras. 18-25; GOV/2008/38, paras. 14-21; GOV/2008/15, paras. 14-25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras. 35-42.

[34] Most recently in GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).

[35] S/RES/1929, paras. 2 and 3.

- Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
- The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
- Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5-C.12).

44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.

45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

H. Design Information

46. The modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards Agreement provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement but which is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.[36] The Agency is still awaiting receipt from Iran of updated design information for the IR-40 Reactor, and further information pursuant to statements it has made concerning the planned construction of new uranium enrichment facilities and the design of a reactor similar to TRR.[37]

47. As reported previously, Iran's response to Agency requests for Iran to confirm or provide further information regarding its statements concerning its intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in "due time" rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.[38]

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[36] In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General's reports (see e.g. GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to "comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1".

[37] GOV/2010/46, para. 32.

[38] See para. 27 of this report and GOV/2011/29, para. 37.

I. Additional Protocol

48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.[39]

J. Other Matters

49. In August 2011, the Agency carried out a PIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) to verify, inter alia, nuclear material, in the form of natural uranium metal and process waste, related to the conversion experiments carried out by Iran between 1995 and 2002.[40,41] The Agency's measurement of this material was 19.8 kg less than the operator's declaration of 270.7 kg. In a letter dated 2 November 2011, Iran provided additional information on this matter. The Agency is working with Iran to try to resolve this discrepancy.

50. As previously reported, in a letter dated 19 June 2011, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to "transfer some of spent fuel assemblies (HEU [high enriched uranium] Control Fuel Element (CFE) and Standard Fuel Element (SFE)) from spent fuel pool (KMPE) to reactor core (KMPB) in order to conduct a research project". As of 15 October 2011, this activity had yet to begin.

51. On 2 and 3 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, during which the Agency noted that the reactor was in operation. Iran subsequently informed the Agency that the reactor has since been shut down for routine maintenance.

K. Summary

52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.[42]

53. The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive

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[39] Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

[40] This material had been under Agency seal since 2003.

[41] GOV/2003/75, paras. 20-25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras. 10-12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, and Annex, paras. 1-7.

[42] The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).

information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.

54. Given the concerns identified above, Iran is requested to engage substantively with the Agency without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme as identified in the Annex to this report.

55. The Agency is working with Iran with a view to resolving the discrepancy identified during the recent PIV at JHL.

56. The Director General urges Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; suspension of heavy water related activities; and, as referred to above, addressing the Agency's serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

57. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Annex

Possible Military Dimensions to Iran's Nuclear Programme

1. This Annex consists of three Sections: Section A, which provides an historical overview of the Agency's efforts to resolve questions about the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme, in particular regarding concerns about possible military dimensions; Section B, which provides a general description of the sources of information available to the Agency and its assessment of the credibility of that information; and Section C, which reflects the Agency's analysis of the information available to it in the context of relevant indicators of the existence or development of processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.

A. Historical Overview

2. Since late 2002, the Director General has reported to the Board of Governors on the Agency's concerns about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Such concerns coincided with the appearance in open sources of information which indicated that Iran was building a large underground nuclear related facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak.[1]

3. Between 2003 and 2004, the Agency confirmed a number of significant failures on the part of Iran to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the processing and use of undeclared nuclear material and the failure to declare facilities where the nuclear material had been received, stored and processed.[2] Specifically, it was discovered that, as early as the late 1970s and early 1980s, and continuing into the 1990s and 2000s, Iran had used undeclared nuclear material for testing and experimentation in several uranium conversion, enrichment, fabrication and irradiation activities, including the separation of plutonium, at undeclared locations and facilities.[3]

4. In October 2003, Iran informed the Director General that it had adopted a policy of full disclosure and had decided to provide the Agency with a full picture of its nuclear activities.[4] Following that announcement, Iran granted the Agency access to locations the Agency requested to visit, provided information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components and made individuals available for interviews. It also continued to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, to which it agreed in February 2003, which provides for the submission of design information on new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of such a facility is taken.[5] In November 2003, Iran announced its intention to sign an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement (which it did in December 2003 following

[1] GOV/2003/40, para. 3.
[2] GOV/2003/40, para. 32; GOV/2003/75, para. 48; GOV/2004/83, paras. 85-86; GOV/2005/67, para. 4.
[3] GOV/2003/75, Annex 1; GOV/2004/83, paras. 85-86.
[4] GOV/2003/75, paras. 13 and 15.
[5] GOV/2003/40, para. 6. Iran stopped implementing the modified Code 3.1 in March 2007 (GOV/2007/22, para. 12).

Board approval of the text), and that, prior to its entry into force, Iran would act in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.[6]

5. Between 2003 and early 2006, Iran submitted inventory change reports, provided design information with respect to facilities where the undeclared activities had taken place and made nuclear material available for Agency verification. Iran also acknowledged that it had utilized entities with links to the Ministry of Defence in some of its previously undeclared activities.[7] Iran acknowledged that it had had contacts with intermediaries of a clandestine nuclear supply network in 1987 and the early 1990s, and that, in 1987, it had received a handwritten one page document offering assistance with the development of uranium centrifuge enrichment technology, in which reference was also made to a reconversion unit with casting equipment.[8] Iran further acknowledged that it had received a package of information related to centrifuge enrichment technology that also included a 15 page document (hereafter referred to as the "uranium metal document") which Iran said it did not ask for and which describes, inter alia, processes for the conversion of uranium fluoride compounds into uranium metal and the production of hemispherical enriched uranium metallic components.[9]

6. The Agency continued to seek clarification of issues with respect to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme, particularly in light of Iran's admissions concerning its contacts with the clandestine nuclear supply network, information provided by participants in that network and information which had been provided to the Agency by a Member State. This last information, collectively referred to as the "alleged studies documentation", which was made known to the Agency in 2005, indicated that Iran had been engaged in activities involving studies on a so-called green salt project, high explosives testing and the re-engineering of a missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a new payload.[10] All of this information, taken together, gave rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

7. In August 2007, Iran and the Agency agreed on "Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues" (generally referred to as the "work plan") (INFCIRC/711). By February 2008, the four items identified in the work plan as "past outstanding issues", and the two items identified as "other outstanding issues", had been determined by the Agency to be either closed, completed or no longer outstanding.[11] The remaining issues which needed to be clarified by Iran related to the alleged studies, together with other matters which had arisen in the course of resolving the six other issues and which needed to be addressed in connection with the alleged studies,

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[6] GOV/2003/75, para. 18. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003, and signed on behalf of Iran and the Agency on 18 December 2003 (GOV/2004/11, para. 5). In February 2006, Iran notified the Agency that it would no longer implement the provisions of the Additional Protocol (GOV/2006/15, para. 31).

[7] GOV/2004/11, para. 37.

[8] Iran has stated that the intermediaries offered the reconversion unit with casting equipment on their own initiative, not at the request of the AEOI. Iran also stated that it did not receive the reconversion unit (GOV/2005/67, para. 14).

[9] GOV/2005/87, para. 6; GOV/2007/58, para. 25. Pakistan confirmed, in response to an Agency inquiry, that an identical document existed in Pakistan (GOV/2008/15, para. 24).

[10] GOV/2006/15, para. 38.

[11] GOV/2007/58, paras. 18, 23, 25; GOV/2008/4, paras. 11, 18, 24, 34.

specifically: the circumstances of Iran's acquisition of the uranium metal document, procurement and research and development (R&D) activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.[12]

8. Between February and May 2008, pursuant to the work plan, the Agency shared with Iran information (including documentation) on the alleged studies, and sought clarifications from Iran.[13] In May 2008, Iran submitted to the Agency a 117 page assessment of that information. While Iran confirmed the veracity of some of the information which the Agency had shared with it (such as acknowledgement of names of people, places and organizations), Iran's assessment was focused on deficiencies in form and format, and dismissed the allegations as having been based on "forged" documents and "fabricated" data.[14]

9. The Agency continued to receive additional information from Member States and acquired new information as a result of its own efforts. The Agency tried without success to engage Iran in discussions about the information, and finally wrote to Iran in October 2010 to inform it about this additional information.[15]

10. Between 2007 and 2010, Iran continued to conceal nuclear activities, by not informing the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of a new nuclear power plant at Darkhovin[16] and a third enrichment facility near Qom (the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant).[17,18] The Agency is still awaiting substantive responses from Iran to Agency requests for further information about its announcements, in 2009 and 2010 respectively, that it had decided to construct ten additional enrichment facilities (the locations for five of which had already been identified)[19] and that it possessed laser enrichment technology.[20]

11. The Agency has continued to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. As additional information has become available to the Agency, the Agency has been able, notwithstanding Iran's lack of engagement, to refine its analysis of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.[21]

B. Credibility of Information

12. As indicated in paragraph 6 above, among the information available to the Agency is the alleged studies documentation: a large volume of documentation (including correspondence, reports, view graphs from presentations, videos and engineering drawings), amounting to over a thousand pages. The information

[12] GOV/2008/15, paras. 14-15, 25.
[13] GOV/2008/15, para. 16.
[14] GOV/2008/38, para. 15.
[15] GOV/2010/62, paras. 34-35.
[16] GOV/2008/38, para. 11.
[17] GOV/2009/74, paras. 7-17.
[18] GOV/2010/10, para. 31; GOV/2010/28, para. 31; GOV/2010/46, para. 31.
[19] GOV/2010/10, para. 33. In August 2010, Iran informed the Agency that the construction of one of these facilities was to start at the end of the current Iranian year (March 2011) or the beginning of the next year (GOV/2010/46, para. 33).
[20] GOV/2010/46, para. 18.
[21] GOV/2011/54, para. 43.

reflected in that documentation is of a technically complex and interconnected nature, showing research, development and testing activities over time. It also contains working level correspondence consistent with the day to day implementation of a formal programme. Consistent with the Agency's practice, that information has been carefully and critically examined. The Agency has also had several meetings with the Member State to clarify the information it had provided, to question the Member State about the forensics it had carried out on the documentation and the information reflected in it, and to obtain more information on the underlying sources.

13. In addition to the alleged studies documentation, the Agency has received information from more than ten Member States. This has included procurement information, information on international travel by individuals said to have been involved in the alleged activities, financial records, documents reflecting health and safety arrangements, and other documents demonstrating manufacturing techniques for certain high explosive components. This information reinforces and tends to corroborate the information reflected in the alleged studies documentation, and relates to activities substantially beyond those identified in that documentation.

14. In addition to the information referred to in paragraphs 12 and 13 above, the Agency has acquired information as a result of its own efforts, including publications and articles acquired through open source research, satellite imagery, the results of Agency verification activities and information provided by Iran in the context of those verification activities.[22] Importantly, the Agency has also had direct discussions with a number of individuals who were involved in relevant activities in Iran, including, for example, an interview with a leading figure in the clandestine nuclear supply network (see paragraph 35 below). The information obtained by the Agency from the discussions with these individuals is consistent with the information provided by Member States, and that acquired through its own efforts, in terms of time frames and technical content.

15. As indicated in paragraph 8 above, Iran has acknowledged certain information reflected in the alleged studies documentation. However, many of the answers given by Iran to questions posed by the Agency in connection with efforts to resolve the Agency's concerns have been imprecise and/or incomplete, and the information has been slow in coming and sometimes contradictory. This, combined with events such as the dismantling of the Lavisan-Shian site in late 2003/early 2004 (see paragraph 19 below), and a pattern of late or after the fact acknowledgement of the existence of previously undeclared parts of Iran's nuclear programme, have tended to increase the Agency's concerns, rather than dispel them.

16. As indicated above, the information consolidated and presented in this Annex comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency's own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is overall consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved and time frames. Based on these considerations, and in light of the Agency's general knowledge of the Iranian nuclear programme and its historical evolution, the Agency finds the information upon which Part C of this Annex is based to be, overall, credible.

[22] Further specific examples are described below in Section C of this Annex.

C. Nuclear Explosive Development Indicators

17. Within its nuclear programme, Iran has developed the capability to enrich uranium to a level of up to 20% U-235, declared to be for use as fuel in research reactors. In the absence of any indicators that Iran is currently considering reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel to extract plutonium,[23] the Agency has, to date, focused its analysis of Iran's nuclear programme on an acquisition path involving high enriched uranium (HEU). Based on indicators observed by the Agency in connection with Iran's nuclear activities, the Agency's work has concentrated on an analysis pertinent to the development of an HEU implosion device.

C.1. Programme management structure

18. The Agency has been provided with information by Member States which indicates that the activities referred to in Sections C.2 to C.12 were, at least for some significant period of time, managed through a programme structure, assisted by advisory bodies, and that, owing to the importance of these efforts, senior Iranian figures featured within this command structure. From analysis of this information and information provided by Iran, and through its own endeavours, the Agency has been able to construct what it believes to be a good understanding of activities undertaken by Iran prior to the end of 2003. The Agency's ability to construct an equally good understanding of activities in Iran after the end of 2003 is reduced, due to the more limited information available to the Agency. For ease of reference, the figure below depicts, in summary form, what the Agency understands of the programme structure, and administrative changes in that structure over the years. Attachment 1 to this Annex provides further details, derived from that information, about the organizational arrangements and projects within that programme structure.



[23] Nevertheless, there are, and have been in the past, activities in Iran relevant to the production of plutonium.

19. The Agency received information from Member States which indicates that, sometime after the commencement by Iran in the late 1980s of covert procurement activities,[24] organizational structures and administrative arrangements for an undeclared nuclear programme were established and managed through the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), and were overseen, through a Scientific Committee, by the Defence Industries Education Research Institute (ERI), established to coordinate defence R&D for the Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Iran has confirmed that the PHRC was established in 1989 at Lavisan-Shian, in Tehran. Iran has stated that the PHRC was created with the purpose of "preparedness to combat and neutralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and accidents (nuclear defence) and also support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defence". Iran has stated further that those activities were stopped in 1998.[25] In late 2003/early 2004, Iran completely cleared the site.[26]

20. According to information provided by Member States, by the late 1990s or early 2000s, the PHRC activities were consolidated under the "AMAD Plan". Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (Mahabadi) was the Executive Officer of the AMAD Plan, the executive affairs of which were performed by the "Orchid Office".[27] Most of the activities carried out under the AMAD Plan appear to have been conducted during 2002 and 2003.

21. The majority of the details of the work said to have been conducted under the AMAD Plan come from the alleged studies documentation which, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, refer to studies conducted in three technical areas: the green salt project; high explosives (including the development of exploding bridgewire detonators); and re-engineering of the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle.

22. According to the Agency's assessment of the information contained in that documentation, the green salt project (identified as Project 5.13) was part of a larger project (identified as Project 5) to provide a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme. The product of this programme would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies (identified as Project 111). As of May 2008, the Agency was not in a position to demonstrate to Iran the connection between Project 5 and Project 111. However, subsequently, the Agency was shown documents which established a connection between Project 5 and Project 111, and hence a link between nuclear material and a new payload development programme.

23. Information the Agency has received from Member States indicates that, owing to growing concerns about the international security situation in Iraq and neighbouring countries at that time, work on the AMAD Plan was stopped rather

[24] GOV/2004/83; GOV/2003/75, Annex 1.

[25] At which time, according to Iran, the centre was changed to the Biological Studies Centre. Iran also stated that, in 2002, the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) was also located at that site, and that, although some of the biological activities continued there, the main objective was to use the capabilities of universities in Iran (in particular at the Malek Ashtar University near Esfahan) for the education and R&D needs of the Ministry of Defence (GOV/2004/83, paras. 100-101).

[26] According to Iran, the site was cleared in 2003/2004 in order to return the land to the local municipality (GOV/2004/60, paras. 42-46; GOV/2004/83, paras. 96-105).

[27] Possibly so named because one of the locations used by the AMAD Plan was on Orchid Street in Tehran.

abruptly pursuant to a "halt order" instruction issued in late 2003 by senior Iranian officials. According to that information, however, staff remained in place to record and document the achievements of their respective projects. Subsequently, equipment and work places were either cleaned or disposed of so that there would be little to identify the sensitive nature of the work which had been undertaken.

24. The Agency has other information from Member States which indicates that some activities previously carried out under the AMAD Plan were resumed later, and that Mr. Fakhrizadeh retained the principal organizational role, first under a new organization known as the Section for Advanced Development Applications and Technologies (SADAT),[28] which continued to report to MODAFL, and later, in mid-2008, as the head of the Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT) in Tehran.[29] The Agency has been advised by a Member State that, in February 2011, Mr. Fakhrizadeh moved his seat of operations from MUT to an adjacent location known as the Modjeh Site, and that he now leads the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research.[30] The Agency is concerned because some of the activities undertaken after 2003 would be highly relevant to a nuclear weapon programme.

C.2. Procurement activities

25. Under the AMAD Plan, Iran's efforts to procure goods and services allegedly involved a number of ostensibly private companies which were able to provide cover for the real purpose of the procurements. The Agency has been informed by several Member States that, for instance, Kimia Maadan was a cover company for chemical engineering operations under the AMAD Plan while also being used to help with procurement for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).[31]

26. In addition, throughout the entire timeline, instances of procurement and attempted procurement by individuals associated with the AMAD Plan of equipment, materials and services which, although having other civilian applications, would be useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device, have either been uncovered by the Agency itself or been made known to it.[32] Among such equipment, materials and services are: high speed electronic switches and spark gaps (useful for triggering and firing detonators); high speed cameras (useful in experimental diagnostics); neutron sources (useful for calibrating neutron measuring equipment); radiation detection and measuring equipment (useful in a nuclear material production environment); and training courses on topics relevant to nuclear explosives development (such as neutron cross section calculations and shock wave interactions/hydrodynamics).

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[28] The information indicates that SADAT consisted of at least seven centres, each responsible for carrying out specific R&D work. The activities were established as overt work applicable to conventional military activities, some with possible nuclear applications. The work in the SADAT Centres drew on resources at Iranian universities which had laboratories available to them and students to do the research.

[29] The information indicates that, in his new role, Mr. Fakhrizadeh merged the SADAT Centres into complexes within MUT, known as "Pardis Tehran".

[30] Known from its Farsi initials as "SPND".

[31] GOV/2008/4, para. 32; GOV/2006/15, para. 39.

[32] GOV/2008/4, para. 40.

C.3. Nuclear material acquisition

27. In 2008, the Director General informed the Board that: the Agency had no information at that time — apart from the uranium metal document — on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies,[33] and that it had not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.[34]

28. However, as indicated in paragraph 22 above, information contained in the alleged studies documentation suggests that Iran was working on a project to secure a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme, the product of which would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies. Additional information provided by Member States indicates that, although uranium was not used, kilogram quantities of natural uranium metal were available to the AMAD Plan.

29. Information made available to the Agency by a Member State, which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran made progress with experimentation aimed at the recovery of uranium from fluoride compounds (using lead oxide as a surrogate material to avoid the possibility of uncontrolled contamination occurring in the workplace).

30. In addition, although now declared and currently under safeguards, a number of facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment (the Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom) were covertly built by Iran and only declared once the Agency was made aware of their existence by sources other than Iran. This, taken together with the past efforts by Iran to conceal activities involving nuclear material, create more concern about the possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran.

C.4. Nuclear components for an explosive device

31. For use in a nuclear device, HEU retrieved from the enrichment process is first converted to metal. The metal is then cast and machined into suitable components for a nuclear core.

32. As indicated in paragraph 5 above, Iran has acknowledged that, along with the handwritten one page document offering assistance with the development of uranium centrifuge enrichment technology, in which reference is also made to a reconversion unit with casting equipment, Iran also received the uranium metal document which describes, inter alia, processes for the conversion of uranium compounds into uranium metal and the production of hemispherical enriched uranium metallic components.

33. The uranium metal document is known to have been available to the clandestine nuclear supply network that provided Iran with assistance in developing its centrifuge enrichment capability, and is also known to be part of a larger package of information which includes elements of a nuclear explosive design. A similar package of information, which surfaced in 2003, was provided by the same network

[33] GOV/2008/15, para. 24.

[34] GOV/2008/38, para. 21.

to Libya.[35] The information in the Libyan package, which was first reviewed by Agency experts in January 2004, included details on the design and construction of, and the manufacture of components for, a nuclear explosive device.[36]

34. In addition, a Member State provided the Agency experts with access to a collection of electronic files from seized computers belonging to key members of the network at different locations. That collection included documents seen in Libya, along with more recent versions of those documents, including an up-dated electronic version of the uranium metal document.

35. In an interview in 2007 with a member of the clandestine nuclear supply network, the Agency was told that Iran had been provided with nuclear explosive design information. From information provided to the Agency during that interview, the Agency is concerned that Iran may have obtained more advanced design information than the information identified in 2004 as having been provided to Libya by the nuclear supply network.

36. Additionally, a Member State provided information indicating that, during the AMAD Plan, preparatory work, not involving nuclear material, for the fabrication of natural and high enriched uranium metal components for a nuclear explosive device was carried out.

37. As the conversion of HEU compounds into metal and the fabrication of HEU metal components suitable in size and quality are steps in the development of an HEU nuclear explosive device, clarification by Iran is needed in connection with the above.

C.5. Detonator development

38. The development of safe, fast-acting detonators, and equipment suitable for firing the detonators, is an integral part of a programme to develop an implosion type nuclear device. Included among the alleged studies documentation are a number of documents relating to the development by Iran, during the period 2002-2003, of fast functioning detonators, known as "exploding bridgewire detonators" or "EBWs" as safe alternatives to the type of detonator described for use in the nuclear device design referred to in paragraph 33 above.

39. In 2008, Iran told the Agency that it had developed EBWs for civil and conventional military applications and had achieved a simultaneity of about one microsecond when firing two to three detonators together,[37] and provided the Agency with a copy of a paper relating to EBW development work presented by two Iranian researchers at a conference held in Iran in 2005. A similar paper was published by the two researchers at an international conference later in 2005.[38] Both papers indicate that suitable high voltage firing equipment had been acquired or developed by Iran. Also in 2008, Iran told the Agency that, before the period 2002-2004, it had already achieved EBW technology. Iran also provided the Agency with

[35] The same network was also the source of an unsolicited offer to Iraq in 1990 for the provision of information dealing with centrifuge enrichment and nuclear weapon manufacturing (GOV/INF/1998/6, Section B.3).

[36] GOV/2004/11, para. 77; GOV/2004/12, paras. 30-32.

[37] GOV/2008/15, para. 20.

[38] The authors of the papers have affiliations to Malek Ashtar University and the Air Defence Industries Group of Tehran.

a short undated document in Farsi, understood to be the specifications for a detonator development programme, and a document from a foreign source showing an example of a civilian application in which detonators are fired simultaneously. However, Iran has not explained to the Agency its own need or application for such detonators.

40. The Agency recognizes that there exist non-nuclear applications, albeit few, for detonators like EBWs, and of equipment suitable for firing multiple detonators with a high level of simultaneity. Notwithstanding, given their possible application in a nuclear explosive device, and the fact that there are limited civilian and conventional military applications for such technology, Iran's development of such detonators and equipment is a matter of concern, particularly in connection with the possible use of the multipoint initiation system referred to below.

C.6. Initiation of high explosives and associated experiments

41. Detonators provide point source initiation of explosives, generating a naturally diverging detonation wave. In an implosion type nuclear explosive device, an additional component, known as a multipoint initiation system, can be used to reshape the detonation wave into a converging smooth implosion to ensure uniform compression of the core fissile material to supercritical density.[39]

42. The Agency has shared with Iran information provided by a Member State which indicates that Iran has had access to information on the design concept of a multipoint initiation system that can be used to initiate effectively and simultaneously a high explosive charge over its surface.[40] The Agency has been able to confirm independently that such a design concept exists and the country of origin of that design concept. Furthermore, the Agency has been informed by nuclear-weapon States that the specific multipoint initiation concept is used in some known nuclear explosive devices. In its 117 page submission to the Agency in May 2008, Iran stated that the subject was not understandable to Iran and that Iran had not conducted any activities of the type referred to in the document.

43. Information provided to the Agency by the same Member State referred to in the previous paragraph describes the multipoint initiation concept referred to above as being used by Iran in at least one large scale experiment in 2003 to initiate a high explosive charge in the form of a hemispherical shell. According to that information, during that experiment, the internal hemispherical curved surface of the high explosive charge was monitored using a large number of optical fibre cables, and the light output of the explosive upon detonation was recorded with a high speed streak camera. It should be noted that the dimensions of the initiation system and the explosives used with it were consistent with the dimensions for the new payload which, according to the alleged studies documentation, were given to the engineers who were studying how to integrate the new payload into the chamber of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle (Project 111) (see Section C.11 below). Further information provided to the Agency by the same Member State indicates that the large scale high explosive experiments were conducted by Iran in the region of Marivan.

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[39] "Supercritical" density is one at which fissionable material is able to sustain a chain reaction in such a manner that the rate of reaction increases.

[40] GOV/2008/15, Annex, Section A.2, Document 3.

44. The Agency has strong indications that the development by Iran of the high explosives initiation system, and its development of the high speed diagnostic configuration used to monitor related experiments, were assisted by the work of a foreign expert who was not only knowledgeable in these technologies, but who, a Member State has informed the Agency, worked for much of his career with this technology in the nuclear weapon programme of the country of his origin. The Agency has reviewed publications by this foreign expert and has met with him. The Agency has been able to verify through three separate routes, including the expert himself, that this person was in Iran from about 1996 to about 2002, ostensibly to assist Iran in the development of a facility and techniques for making ultra-dispersed diamonds ("UDDs" or "nanodiamonds"), where he also lectured on explosion physics and its applications.

45. Furthermore, the Agency has received information from two Member States that, after 2003, Iran engaged in experimental research involving a scaled down version of the hemispherical initiation system and high explosive charge referred to in paragraph 43 above, albeit in connection with non-nuclear applications. This work, together with other studies made known to the Agency in which the same initiation system is used in cylindrical geometry, could also be relevant to improving and optimizing the multipoint initiation design concept relevant to nuclear applications.

46. The Agency's concern about the activities described in this Section derives from the fact that a multipoint initiation system, such as that described above, can be used in a nuclear explosive device. However, Iran has not been willing to engage in discussion of this topic with the Agency.

C.7. Hydrodynamic experiments

47. One necessary step in a nuclear weapon development programme is determining whether a theoretical design of an implosion device, the behaviour of which can be studied through computer simulations, will work in practice. To that end, high explosive tests referred to as "hydrodynamic experiments" are conducted in which fissile and nuclear components may be replaced with surrogate materials.[41]

48. Information which the Agency has been provided by Member States, some of which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear explosive components using high density materials such as tungsten. These components were said to have incorporated small central cavities suitable for the insertion of capsules such as those described in Section C.9 below. The end use of such components remains unclear, although they can be linked to other information received by the Agency concerning experiments involving the use of high speed diagnostic equipment, including flash X ray, to monitor the symmetry of the compressive shock of the simulated core of a nuclear device.

[41] Hydrodynamic experiments can be designed to simulate the first stages of a nuclear explosion. In such experiments, conventional high explosives are detonated to study the effects of the explosion on specific materials. The term "hydrodynamic" is used because material is compressed and heated with such intensity that it begins to flow and mix like a fluid, and "hydrodynamic equations" are used to describe the behaviour of fluids.

49. Other information which the Agency has been provided by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The explosives vessel, or chamber, is said to have been put in place at Parchin in 2000. A building was constructed at that time around a large cylindrical object at a location at the Parchin military complex. A large earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a neighbouring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber. The Agency has obtained commercial satellite images that are consistent with this information. From independent evidence, including a publication by the foreign expert referred to in paragraph 44 above, the Agency has been able to confirm the date of construction of the cylinder and some of its design features (such as its dimensions), and that it was designed to contain the detonation of up to 70 kilograms of high explosives, which would be suitable for carrying out the type of experiments described in paragraph 43 above.

50. As a result of information the Agency obtained from a Member State in the early 2000s alleging that Iran was conducting high explosive testing, possibly in association with nuclear materials, at the Parchin military complex, the Agency was permitted by Iran to visit the site twice in 2005. From satellite imagery available at that time, the Agency identified a number of areas of interest, none of which, however, included the location now believed to contain the building which houses the explosives chamber mentioned above; consequently, the Agency's visits did not uncover anything of relevance.

51. Hydrodynamic experiments such as those described above, which involve high explosives in conjunction with nuclear material or nuclear material surrogates, are strong indicators of possible weapon development. In addition, the use of surrogate material, and/or confinement provided by a chamber of the type indicated above, could be used to prevent contamination of the site with nuclear material. It remains for Iran to explain the rationale behind these activities.

C.8. Modelling and calculations

52. Information provided to the Agency by two Member States relating to modelling studies alleged to have been conducted in 2008 and 2009 by Iran is of particular concern to the Agency. According to that information, the studies involved the modelling of spherical geometries, consisting of components of the core of an HEU nuclear device subjected to shock compression, for their neutronic behaviour at high density, and a determination of the subsequent nuclear explosive yield. The information also identifies models said to have been used in those studies and the results of these calculations, which the Agency has seen. The application of such studies to anything other than a nuclear explosive is unclear to the Agency. It is therefore essential that Iran engage with the Agency and provide an explanation.

53. The Agency obtained information in 2005 from a Member State indicating that, in 1997, representatives from Iran had met with officials from an institute in a nuclear-weapon State to request training courses in the fields of neutron cross section calculations using computer codes employing Monte Carlo methodology, and shock wave interactions with metals. In a letter dated 14 May 2008, Iran advised the Agency that there was nothing to support this information. The Agency has also been provided with information by a Member State indicating that, in 2005, arrangements were made in Iran for setting up projects within SADAT centres (see

Section C.1 and Attachment 1), inter alia, to establish a databank for "equation of state" information[42] and a hydrodynamics calculation centre. The Agency has also been provided with information from a different Member State that, in 2005, a senior official in SADAT solicited assistance from Shahid Behesti University in connection with complex calculations relating to the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.

54. Research by the Agency into scientific literature published over the past decade has revealed that Iranian workers, in particular groups of researchers at Shahid Behesti University and Amir Kabir University, have published papers relating to the generation, measurement and modelling of neutron transport.[43] The Agency has also found, through open source research, other Iranian publications which relate to the application of detonation shock dynamics to the modelling of detonation in high explosives, and the use of hydrodynamic codes in the modelling of jet formation with shaped (hollow) charges. Such studies are commonly used in reactor physics or conventional ordnance research,[44] but also have applications in the development of nuclear explosives.

C.9. Neutron initiator

55. The Agency has information from a Member State that Iran has undertaken work to manufacture small capsules suitable for use as containers of a component containing nuclear material. The Agency was also informed by a different Member State that Iran may also have experimented with such components in order to assess their performance in generating neutrons. Such components, if placed in the centre of a nuclear core of an implosion type nuclear device and compressed, could produce a burst of neutrons suitable for initiating a fission chain reaction. The location where the experiments were conducted was said to have been cleaned of contamination after the experiments had taken place. The design of the capsule, and the material associated with it, are consistent with the device design information which the clandestine nuclear supply network allegedly provided to Iran.

56. The Agency also has information from a Member State that work in this technical area may have continued in Iran after 2004, and that Iran embarked on a four year programme, from around 2006 onwards, on the further validation of the design of this neutron source, including through the use of a non-nuclear material to avoid contamination.

57. Given the importance of neutron generation and transport, and their effect on geometries containing fissile materials in the context of an implosion device, Iran needs to explain to the Agency its objectives and capabilities in this field.

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[42] An "equation of state" is a thermodynamic equation describing the state of matter under a given set of physical conditions (such as temperature, pressure, volume or internal energy).

[43] The modelling of neutron transport refers to the study of the motions and interactions of neutrons with materials which are used to see where they are and in what direction and at what speed they are going.

[44] For example, the shaped (hollow) charge studies said by Member States to have been carried out by the Centre for Research and Development of Explosion and Shock Technology, also known as "METFAZ", have conventional military applications (such as for developing armour piercing projectiles), but can also be used to develop computer codes which can then be adapted to model nuclear explosives.

C.10. Conducting a test

58. The Agency has information provided by a Member State that Iran may have planned and undertaken preparatory experimentation which would be useful were Iran to carry out a test of a nuclear explosive device. In particular, the Agency has information that Iran has conducted a number of practical tests to see whether its EBW firing equipment would function satisfactorily over long distances between a firing point and a test device located down a deep shaft. Additionally, among the alleged studies documentation provided by that Member State, is a document, in Farsi, which relates directly to the logistics and safety arrangements that would be necessary for conducting a nuclear test. The Agency has been informed by a different Member State that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon States.

C.11. Integration into a missile delivery vehicle

59. The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111. From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.

60. According to that documentation, using a number of commercially available computer codes, Iran conducted computer modelling studies of at least 14 progressive design iterations of the payload chamber and its contents to examine how they would stand up to the various stresses that would be encountered on being launched and travelling on a ballistic trajectory to a target. It should be noted that the masses and dimensions of components identified in information provided to the Agency by Member States that Iran is alleged to have been developing (see paragraphs 43 and 48 above) correspond to those assessed to have been used in Project 111 engineering studies on the new payload chamber.

61. During these studies, prototype components were allegedly manufactured at workshops known to exist in Iran but which Iran refused the Agency permission to visit. The six engineering groups said to have worked under Project 111 produced many technical reports, which comprise a substantial part of the alleged studies documentation. The Agency has studied these reports extensively and finds that they are both internally consistent and consistent with other supporting information related to Project 111.

62. The alleged studies documentation also shows that, as part of the activities undertaken within Project 111, consideration was being given to subjecting the prototype payload and its chamber to engineering stress tests to see how well they would stand up in practice to simulated launch and flight stresses (so-called "environmental testing"). This work would have complemented the engineering modelling simulation studies referred to in paragraph 60 above. According to the information reflected in the alleged studies documentation, within Project 111, some, albeit limited, preparations were also being undertaken to enable the assembly of manufactured components.

63. Iran has denied conducting the engineering studies, claiming that the documentation which the Agency has is in electronic format and so could have been manipulated, and that it would have been easy to fabricate.[45] However, the quantity of the documentation, and the scope and contents of the work covered in the documentation, are sufficiently comprehensive and complex that, in the Agency's view, it is not likely to have been the result of forgery or fabrication. While the activities described as those of Project 111 may be relevant to the development of a non-nuclear payload, they are highly relevant to a nuclear weapon programme.

C.12. Fuzing, arming and firing system

64. The alleged studies documentation indicates that, as part of the studies carried out by the engineering groups under Project 111 to integrate the new payload into the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile, additional work was conducted on the development of a prototype firing system that would enable the payload to explode both in the air above a target, or upon impact of the re-entry vehicle with the ground. Iran was shown this information, which, in its 117 page submission (referred to above in paragraph 8), it dismissed as being "an animation game".

65. The Agency, in conjunction with experts from Member States other than those which had provided the information in question, carried out an assessment of the possible nature of the new payload. As a result of that assessment, it was concluded that any payload option other than nuclear which could also be expected to have an airburst option (such as chemical weapons) could be ruled out. Iran was asked to comment on this assessment and agreed in the course of a meeting with the Agency which took place in Tehran in May 2008 that, if the information upon which it was based were true, it would constitute a programme for the development of a nuclear weapon. Attachment 2 to this Annex reproduces the results of the Agency's assessment as it was presented by the Secretariat to the Member States in the technical briefing which took place in February 2008.

[45] GOV/2008/15, para. 22.

Attachment 1: List of Departments, Projects and Centres

PHRC Departments	AMAD Plan Projects	SADAT Centres
Department 01 Nuclear Physics	Project 110 Payload Design	Centre for Readiness & New Defence Technologies
Department 02 Centrifuge Enrichment	Project 111 Payload Integration	Centre for R&D (1) of Explosion & Shock Technology
Department 03 Laser Enrichment	Project 3 Manufacture of Components	Centre for Industrial Research & Construction
Department 04 Uranium Conversion	3.12 Explosives and EBW detonator	Centre for R&T (2) of Advanced Materials – Chemistry
Department 05 Geology	3.14 Uranium metallurgy	Centre for R&T of Advanced Materials – Metallurgy
Department 06 Health Physics	Project 4 Uranium Enrichment	Centre for R&D of New Aerospace Technology
Department 07 Workshop	Project 5 Uranium Mining, Concentration & Conversion	Centre for Laser & Photonics Applications
Department 08 Heavy Water	5.13 Green Salt Project	
Department 09 Analytical Laboratory	5.15 Gchine Mine Project	
Department 10 Computing	Projects 8, 9 and 10	
Department 20 Analysis	Project Health and Safety	
	Project 19 Involvement of IAP	
	Project/Group 117 Procurement and Supply	

(1) R&D = Research & Development
(2) R&T = Research & Technology

Attachment 2: Analysis of Payload



United Nations A/66/546–S/2011/696

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Security Council

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Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 83
The rule of law at the national and international levels

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Letter dated 4 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to your letter dated 14 October 2011, I wish to state the following:

The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects and denies the involvement of any of its officials or organs in the alleged plot against the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington which has been claimed by the United States and reiterates its position concerning this matter as reflected in my letter dated 11 October 2011 addressed to you (A/66/513-S/2011/633).

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a victim of international and state terrorism, condemns all acts of terrorism and reaffirms its commitment to its obligations under the relevant international legal instruments, including the 1973 "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents". In line with the very same commitment, upon receiving a notification through INTERPOL in Washington regarding the possibility of the presence in Iranian territory of an alleged offender connected to a crime under the Convention, the case was immediately submitted to competent law enforcement authorities to investigate the presence of the alleged offender for the purpose of his prosecution in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The result of this investigation was that the name circulated by the United States authorities as the alleged offender is a member of the Mujahideen Khalq Organization (MKO) terrorist group. This information was communicated to INTERPOL in Washington through General Secretariat of INTERPOL (see annex).

The claims mentioned in the criminal complaint against the alleged suspect could by no means substantiate the United States allegations against any elements or officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is no shred of credible evidence to link the alleged suspect or to attribute the alleged plot to the organs of the Islamic Republic of Iran including Al Quds Force, which is an official branch of Iran's military and operates with full transparency under relevant laws and regulations. Attributing an alleged attempted plot by an individual to a foreign

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government on the basis of a series of suspicious phone calls and/or money transfers is only a mockery of a professional criminal investigation and genuine due process.

The United States has rushed to fabricate this plot to pressure Iran and further its Iranophobian policies, while even the alleged suspect was yet to be brought before any competent and impartial court. It would be absurd to level unfounded allegations against a state said to be made by an individual who, even according to the United States press, later denied the charges against him on 24 October 2011 in court. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the United States approach is far from being in good faith.

It is worth mentioning that the United States Government failed to act according to its commitments under article 4 of the 1973 Convention.

The United States attitude with regard to the alleged plot, which began with an explosive media campaign against Iran, coupled with the United States long-standing anti-Iranian policies and also its history of raising baseless allegations against other sovereign States, casts real doubt about the intention of the United States Administration. The United Nations and its Member States should be vigilant about the dire consequences of the United States persistence in propagating fabricated claims and disinformation against other countries. The United States Government shall be held accountable for the baseless allegations against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, allegations which may lead to undermining international peace and security.

Upon instructions by my Government and in line with article 6 of the 1973 Convention, I would like to request you to notify the concerned State and other States Parties to the Convention about the measures taken by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 83, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammad **Khazaee**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 4 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Dear colleagues:

Ref is made to the diffusion No: CXR/20111030765 dated 15/01/2011, issued by NCB Washington/United States of America, Please be advised that:

According to the conducted investigations the a/m person is not member of Iranian Islamic revolutionary Guard Corps — QODS force, at all.

Based on the conducted inquires from competent authorities be informed that a person with the following ID particulars is member of MKO terrorist group:

- SHAKURI f/n Gholam or Gholamhossein, holder of passport No: K10295631 issued in US on 30/11/2006.

(The MKO is a terrorist group that conducted hundreds of mortal activities against Islamic Republic of Iran civilians, officials and properties during the last 30 years ago. Leaders of the MKO organization and many of its members are wanted by our competent judicial authorities for the mentioned offenses. Upon our request IPSG has issued red notices against the terrorist group members.)

To IPSG:

You are kindly requested to provide us with concise and complementary information from NCB Washington about the above-mentioned subject.

United Nations S/2011/697

Security Council

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Letter dated 8 November 2011 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as President of the Security Council, I am forwarding to you a letter dated 20 October 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (see annex) based on the conclusions of the Working Group on children and armed conflict in Iraq adopted on 30 September 2011 (S/AC.51/2011/6).

(*Signed*) José Filipe Moraes **Cabral**
President of the Security Council

11-58505 (E) 101111

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Annex

Letter dated 20 October 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict addressed to the Secretary-General

At its 31st meeting, on 22 June 2011, the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examined the first report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Iraq (S/2011/366), covering the period from January 2008 to December 2010. At its 32nd meeting on 30 September 2011, the Working Group adopted its conclusions on children and armed conflict in Iraq (S/AC.51/2011/6).

In follow-up to the recommendations of the Working Group, approved by the Security Council, and subject to and consistent with applicable international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011), I am entrusted, in my capacity as the Chairman of the Working Group, to welcome the efforts of your Special Representative in Iraq to strengthen the child protection capacity of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), including by the deployment of a child protection adviser, and encourage further efforts in this regard.

The Working Group requests that you, through UNAMI and the United Nations Children's Fund, devise ways to ensure the proper deployment and outreach of child protection actors throughout the territory of Iraq.

The Working Group also requests that you direct the country task force on monitoring and reporting in Iraq to exchange relevant information with, make recommendations and provide necessary assistance to the intergovernmental committee on Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) established by the Government of Iraq.

(*Signed*) Peter **Wittig**
Chairman
Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

United Nations S/2011/698

Security Council

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9 November 2011

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Letter dated 8 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, under the presidency of Portugal, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on the subject "Maintenance of international peace and security: new challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention" on Wednesday, 23 November 2011. In order to help steer the discussions on the subject, Portugal has prepared the attached concept note (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) José Filipe **Moraes Cabral**
Ambassador

11-58568 (E) 141111

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Annex

Concept note on new challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention

The Security Council has in recent years devoted a substantial degree of attention to the evolving nature of challenges to international peace and security. In its presidential statement of 23 September 2010, the Council acknowledged that trend and highlighted challenges such as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, transnational organized crime, piracy, drug and human trafficking. The Council went on to say that it thus reaffirmed that international peace and security now required a more comprehensive and concerted approach (S/PRST/2010/18).

In the course of 2011, the Council held various separate meetings on a number of issues identified as being among the key growing challenges to international peace and security.

On 11 February 2011, at the initiative of Brazil, the Council held an open debate on the interdependence between security and development. The event built on previous related discussions, including the Council debate held in September 2010, and its presidential statement underlined the interlinkage between security and development and the need "to consider relevant economic, political and social dimensions of conflict" (S/PRST/2011/4).

On 7 June 2011, the Council held a high-level debate on HIV/AIDS under the agenda item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" (S/PV.6547). Organized by Gabon, the debate led to the adoption of resolution 1983 (2011), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to consider the HIV-related needs of people living with, affected by and vulnerable to HIV, including women and girls, in his activities pertinent to the prevention and resolution of conflict, the maintenance of international peace and security, the prevention and response to sexual violence related to conflict, and post-conflict peacebuilding. This was the second time the impact of HIV/AIDS on international peace and security was discussed by the Security Council. In 2000, the United States had promoted an open debate, chaired by then United States Vice President Al Gore, which resulted in the adoption of resolution 1308 (2000). It was the first time a medical issue had been firmly placed within the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Still under Gabon's presidency, on 24 June 2011, the Council was briefed on the growing problem of transnational crime, including drug and human trafficking, in West Africa. The Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, who briefed the Council, stated that international drug trafficking was a threat to international peace and security in West Africa and stressed the need to bolster regional capacity and strengthen international cooperation to confront it.

On 20 July 2011, under the agenda item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", Germany organized an open debate on the impact of climate change on the maintenance of international peace and security (S/PV.6587 and Resumption 1). The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15) expressing concern that sea-level rise might carry security implications on low-lying island States. It also requested the Secretary-General to include contextual information on possible security implications of climate change in his reporting on

situations on the Council's agenda. The first time the issue had been brought to the attention of the Council was during an open debate under the presidency of the United Kingdom in April 2007.

Objectives

In line with the thinking expressed in the Council's September 2010 presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/18), Portugal will hold a high-level briefing on 23 November that will take stock of the debates referred to above and look, in a comprehensive manner, at a spectrum of recently identified challenges to international peace and security. It will build upon the knowledge and understanding of the concerns emerging from the separate debates throughout the year, in order to achieve a more integrated vision.

Portugal proposes that the debate also examine possibilities for devising a framework for a regular, comprehensive and systematic focus on these issues, including, when relevant, the interlinkage between them, through which new developments, reports of the Secretary-General and briefings from relevant United Nations agencies and bodies could be channelled for concerted consideration.

1. Illicit trafficking (in arms, drugs and persons) and organized crime and their overall impact on international security

Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, will brief the Council on developments, in particular at the regional and international levels, including efforts to bring greater attention to the consequences of transnational threats on regional and international security, to mobilize political will to act and to give added support to making more effective use of United Nations instruments and tools designed to prevent and control drugs and crime.

Mr. Fedotov will also give a briefing on a system-wide United Nations response to raise awareness of and mobilize collective action against the growing and multifaceted threat of transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, and on the need for States and the United Nations system to mainstream responses to these challenges and to act preventively, by integrating such concerns into development, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and disarmament activities.

2. The impact of climate change on refugees and displaced persons

Factors related to climate change, including drought, famine, desertification, and mass population displacement and movement, can lead to insecurity and conflict. António Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, will be requested to brief the Council on the impact of climate change on refugees and displaced persons, focusing on movements of people linked to desertification, and on the implications of sea-level rise and the consequent loss of territory for some States, particularly small low-lying island States.

3. The risks for peace and security resulting from pandemics and the spread of diseases

Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization, will be asked to brief the Council on the risks for peace and security resulting from

pandemics and the spread of diseases in conflict situations, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria, with a particular focus on their impact on the most vulnerable.

Towards a more systematic and concerted approach of the Security Council

The Security Council has emphasized the mutually reinforcing and interlinked nature of the root causes and drivers of these challenges to peace and security, and the need to address the issues in a comprehensive manner, by taking into account development, human rights, peace, security and certain environmental factors together (S/PRST/2010/18).

The Council has devoted a considerable amount of time and resources to discussing these challenges, but it could make better use of available information to enhance its capacity to play a preventive and mitigating role. More concerted and regular Security Council action could make a difference and bear fruit.

Questions

How can the Security Council better monitor and closely follow up relevant developments on these issues, including on the implementation of any Council decisions taken on them? How is it possible to ensure that the Council follows these issues in a more strategic way?

How can the Council better promote cooperation with the United Nations agencies and bodies dealing with the relevant matters and enhance cooperation in conflict prevention between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations?

How can the Council effectively encourage international efforts to strengthen international legal frameworks in these areas?

How is it possible to ensure that the Council is regularly updated on these issues and better prepared to respond efficiently and in a timely manner to them? What could be the role of the Secretariat in increasing awareness on these issues?

What role could civil society have in addressing these challenges and in helping to raise awareness about them?

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Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 35
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 8 November 2011, regarding the recent meeting held between representatives of the Russian Government and the occupation regime of Abkhazia on the delimitation of the state borders and the demarcation of the territorial waters (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

Alexander **Lomaia**
Permanent Representative

11-58852 (E) 141111

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Annex to the letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the recent meeting held between representatives of the Russian Government and the occupation regime of Abkhazia on the delimitation of the state borders and the demarcation of the territorial waters

On 8 November 2011, mass media sources disseminated reports according to which a third meeting between representatives of the Russian Government and the occupation regime of Abkhazia on the delimitation of the state borders and the demarcation of the territorial waters of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia is being held in Sokhumi in Georgia's occupied region of Abkhazia, Georgia.

The Georgian Foreign Ministry states that these so-called "negotiations" between the occupant country and the occupation regime it has created are in violation of international law and that any agreement these two parties may reach will be illegal and meaningless, as the Georgian Government is the only party authorized to conduct negotiations regarding the delimitation of Georgia's state borders and territorial waters.

Tbilisi, 8 November 2011

United Nations S/2011/700

Security Council

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10 November 2011

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Identical letters dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write yet again to draw your attention to the continuous rocket fire emanating from the Gaza Strip.

On 6 November 2011, two rockets fell on Kibbutz Zikim, injuring a man who was sleeping in his bed. These attacks follow a significant escalation of rocket fire over the past two weeks, during which more than 60 rockets, missiles and mortars have been fired into the major cities and communities of southern Israel. In the past two weeks alone, one Israeli civilian has been killed and many others have been injured.

There is no question that Hamas and the other terrorists in Gaza who carry out these attacks deliberately target Israeli civilians. They leave permanent scars. Dozens have been treated for shock. Homes have been destroyed. Farms have been damaged. More than 200,000 Israeli children were kept out of school last week to ensure their safety, with some returning to playgrounds with gaping holes left by exploding rockets. No people should live under such a spectre of terror and violence.

This is the third letter that I have sent to the Security Council in the past two weeks. Yet, we have still not heard a single word of condemnation of these attacks from the Council. Not one word. For each and every Israeli citizen, the Security Council's silence speaks volumes.

As rockets continue to fly into Israeli homes, hospitals and schools, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has a responsibility to speak out. It is time for PA President Abbas to finally raise his voice and condemn the terror flowing from the Gaza Strip, without hesitation or equivocation.

Every rocket, mortar and missile fired into Israel represents a flagrant violation of international law — and Israel will continue to hold the Hamas terrorist organization fully responsible for all attacks emanating from Gaza, where it remains in de facto control.

To avoid a further escalation, the Security Council and the international community must take immediate action, condemning these attacks unequivocally. All responsible members of the international community have a duty to speak with a common voice and act with a common purpose against the continuous terrorism emanating from the Gaza Strip.

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For any nation, there can be no greater priority, responsibility or obligation than safeguarding the security of its citizens. Israel is no exception. Israel has exercised and will continue to exercise its right to self-defence, as appropriate, and will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative